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It's tough to make predictions, especially about the
future.
-Yogi Berra
INTRODUCTION

While Yogi Berra was undoubtedly correct about the difficulty of
predicting future events, predicting past events has its own
complications. Indeed, sometimes predicting the past is more difficult
because doing so requires ignoring the present. Seldom in everyday life
do people need to predict past events, but the law often requires judges
and juries to assess what the ex ante probabilities were at some point
in the past for events about which the actual outcomes are already
known. For example, police officers often conduct searches without a
warrant. After such a search, a judge must sometimes decide whether
the police officers had probable cause to conduct the search before the
search began. But the judge knows that the search did, in fact, uncover
evidence of a crime. The fact that the search was successful, however,
should not affect the judge's determination of whether the officers had
probable cause before the search. In such instances, the judge must
determine an ex ante probability in an ex post world.
Predicting what the probable future looked like in the past from
the vantage point of the known future is fraught with peril. In theory,
factfinders can place themselves back in the relevant time period and
don a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, the event in question has
neither happened nor not; it is a probability. The opacity of the veil is
critical. After all, Schrodinger's cat is no longer a paradox if the animal
is housed in a see-through glass box. In reality, however, any such veil
is tattered and transparent. If the factfinder knows what actually
happened, this information will influence the calculation of what the
probabilities of an outcome occurring were before it occurred. 2 The task
of estimating past probabilities of an outcome occurring when one
knows what in fact occurred is so notoriously difficult that it has its own
designation: hindsight bias.

1.
Peter C. Carstensen, The Philadelphia National Bank Presumption:Merger Analysis in
an Unpredictable World, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 242 (2015) (quoting Yogi Berra).
Probabilities vary between 0 and 1-or, in common parlance, between 0% and 100%.
2.
When the probability of an event is greater than 0.5, it is more likely than not. Judges are trying
to determine where on that probability continuum a particular event resides. But this post hoc
estimation occurs at a time when the outcome is known to be 0 or 1 because the events being
predicted have already occurred.
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The modern field of study into hindsight bias was launched by
Baruch Fischhoff. 3 Fischhoff provided his research subjects with a
primer on the 1810s conflict between British forces and Nepalese
Gurkhas near Northern India. He suggested four possible outcomes:
British victory, Gurkha victory, a peace settlement, and a military
stalemate with no peace settlement. The subjects were then divided into
five groups. One group was given no information about the ultimate
outcome of the conflict. Subjects in each of the remaining four groups
were told that one of the four outcomes had, in fact, occurred. The
subjects were then asked to assess the probability of each of the
outcomes at the time that the conflict began. On average, the members
of each group thought that the outcome that they had been told occurred
was the most likely outcome a priori, even though they had been
instructed to ignore what they "knew" about the ultimate outcome.
Fischhoff referred to this phenomenon as "creeping determinism": the
effect that being told "an outcome's occurrence consistently increases its
perceived likelihood" before the fact.4 Subsequent studies confirmed his
earlier results.5 Fischhoff's studies effectively created the field of
research on hindsight bias. 6
Although the historic battlefields of Northern India are a great
distance from America's federal courthouses in which antitrust
litigation is adjudicated, Fischhoff's scholarship provides insights into
how judges and juries decide antitrust cases. Antitrust law provides the
rules for competitive markets. For example, the Sherman Act condemns
illegal monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to
restrain trade because these forms of conduct prevent the efficient
supply of goods and services to consumers at competitive prices. A
growing body of scholarship in behavioral economics explains how
cognitive biases can prevent competitive markets from operating
efficiently when consumers or corporations do not behave as predicted

3.

Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight t Foresight:The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment

Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288 (1975).

4.
Id. at 292.
5.
Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, "IKnew It Would Happen": Remembered Probabilitiesof
Once-Future Things, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1, 3 (1975) ("[S]ubjects
were provided with outcome knowledge regarding various events and asked to respond as they
would have 'had they not known what happened.' These subjects responded more like subjects who
knew what had happened than those who did not. . . .").
6.
Doron Teichman, The Hindsight Bias and the Law in Hindsight, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 354, 355 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman

eds., 2014) (discussing Fischhoffs British-Gurkha study); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie,
Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events after the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL.
311, 312 (1990) (same).
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by simple microeconomic models. 7 The emerging field of literature in
which behavioral economics is applied to antitrust law-sometimes
called behavioral antitrust-has not yet considered the significance of
hindsight bias to antitrust jurisprudence. This Article explains why
hindsight bias is important to behavioral antitrust.
Part One of this Article explains how hindsight bias affects a
person's ability to accurately assess ex ante probabilities when the
ultimate outcomes are known. Such hindsight bias has been
documented across many different subject areas and is exhibited by
educated professionals. 8 The risk of hindsight bias is important because
many areas of law require the factfinder to predict, after the actual
outcome is known, how probable a particular outcome was before it
happened.
Part Two explores how hindsight bias can affect decisions in
antitrust cases. Antitrust law often requires judges to place themselves
in the position of one of the litigating parties at an earlier time and to
make predictions, as of that point in time, about future outcomes. This
Part discusses three areas of antitrust law in which hindsight bias
occurs. First, in attempted monopolization jurisprudence the factfinder
must determine whether, at the time a defendant's anticompetitive
conduct occurred, it was likely to create monopoly power. Engaging in
anticompetitive conduct alone does not constitute an illegal attempt to
monopolize. The defendant who engages in such conduct is only liable
if the defendant possessed a "dangerous probability" of succeeding in its
effort to monopolize the relevant market. 9 In many cases, however,
judges use information about what eventually happened when
calculating the probability of monopolization at the time that the
anticompetitive conduct began.1 0 Judges therefore often find no
dangerous probability of monopolization because the defendant did not
in fact succeed in monopolizing the market." This is classic hindsight
bias.
Second, predatory pricing cases often present a specialized case
of hindsight bias. Predatory pricing is a business strategy in which a

See generally Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J.
7.
1527, 1531 (2011) (addressing the "implications of the increasing interest in behavioral economics
for competition policy"); Avishalom Tor, UnderstandingBehavioralAntitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573,
573 (2014) (explaining how "antitrust law can and should account for systematic and predictable
boundedly rational behavior that is neither constant nor uniform").
See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
8.
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
9.
10. See infra Section II.A (discussing cases).
11. See infra Section II.A.
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firm first charges a price below its costs in order to drive its competitors
from the market and then charges a monopoly price-that is, a price
above competitive levels. 12 Predatory pricing claims require a
probability analysis because the plaintiff must show that when the
defendant was charging a price below cost, it possessed a dangerous
probability of later recouping that investment in below-cost pricing by
charging a monopoly price. 13 Yet some courts have held that a
defendant's actual failure to ultimately succeed in recouping its losses
must mean that there was never a dangerous probability that the
defendant could recoup its losses in the first place. 14
Third, courts sometimes exhibit hindsight bias in antitrust
conspiracy cases. Section One of the Sherman Act condemns
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.15 Some types of
agreements between competitors, such as price-fixing conspiracies, are
per se illegal. This means that the agreement is presumed to be
anticompetitive as a matter of law. Such price-fixing agreements violate
Section One even if they do not actually succeed in raising prices. Yet
in some cases, courts have reasoned that if the (alleged) conspiracy has
failed, then it must not have existed in the first place. 16 Part Two
explains how this is a peculiar example of hindsight bias. Part Two
concludes by explaining how hindsight bias in antitrust jurisprudence
seems to consistently favor the defendants.
Part Three discusses how hindsight bias effectively amends
antitrust doctrine. For example, if plaintiffs bringing attempted
monopolization claims must prove that the attempt succeeded in order
to convince a court that the defendant had a dangerous probability of
doing so, then the cause of action for attempted monopolization
effectively does not exist; only actual monopolization would be illegal.
Similarly, if predatory pricing plaintiffs must prove actual recoupment,
that fundamentally weakens the antitrust rule against using below-cost
pricing to drive efficient competitors from the market. Finally,
hindsight bias creates the risk of courts effectively rewriting Section
One of the Sherman Act because if a price-fixing agreement's lack of
success is evidence that no such agreement ever existed, then the
plaintiffs bringing per se claims must prove anticompetitive effects. The
12. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section II.B (discussing cases).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal.").
16. See infra Section II.C (discussing cases).

1532

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:5:1527

per se rule's presumption of anticompetitive effects would cease to exist.
Part Three shows how these changes in antitrust doctrine would
undermine the ability of antitrust law to protect consumers and
efficient competitors from antitrust injury.
Part Four evaluates how courts may try to reduce the risk of
hindsight bias distorting results in antitrust litigation. One approach
would be to use limiting instructions that charge jurors not to use actual
outcome information to assess ex ante probabilities. Research shows
17
that taking this approach will fail precisely because of hindsight bias.
Another approach would be to rely more heavily on judges rather than
juries, based on the assumption that judges can resist hindsight bias.
This assumption is, unfortunately, flawed. Indeed, the cases in Part
Two all involved federal judges falling victim to hindsight bias in
antitrust cases. 18 Part Four concludes that the best way to reduce the
risk of hindsight bias is to have antitrust cases decided by juries who
remain uninformed about the success or failure of the defendants'
attempted monopolization, predatory pricing scheme, or alleged
conspiracy. Although post-conduct information may have some
evidentiary value, its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect due to hindsight bias. Ultimately, judges can only
prevent hindsight bias by limiting the information that the jury sees.
I. HINDSIGHT BIAS AND THE LAW
The potential for hindsight bias exists when a person is tasked
with determining the ex ante probability of an event after the fact. If
people learn that the event did not, in fact, occur, they are more likely
to believe that the before-the-fact probability of the event occurring was
relatively low. Conversely, if people learn that the event did later occur,
they are more likely to say that the event was highly probable-perhaps
inevitable-all along. This phenomenon is hindsight bias: the "using [of]
known outcomes to assess the predictability at some earlier time of
something that has already happened."1 9 Because of hindsight bias,

17. See infra Section W.A.
18. See infra Sections II.A-II.C.
19. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 803 (2001). Hindsight bias can also take the form of people misremembering
their prior predictions and, after the fact, claiming that they were more accurate than they actually
were. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER

UNCERTAINTY:

HEURISTICS AND

BIASES

335,

341 (Daniel

Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) ("[People] even misremember their own
predictions so as to exaggerate in hindsight what they knew in foresight."); Barbara Mellers & A.
Peter McGraw, Self-serving Beliefs and the Pleasure of Outcomes, in 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
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"[p]eople overstate their own ability to have predicted the past and
believe that others should have been able to predict events better than
was possible." 20
Once people learn the actual outcome of an event or a plan, they
cannot replicate the uncertainty that existed before they knew the
outcome. 2 1 Because "people consistently exaggerate what could have
been anticipated in foresight," hindsight bias makes outcomes seem
inevitable in retrospect. 22 After people see an outcome as inevitable,
they treat that outcome as necessarily predictable. 23 After all, how
could any other outcome have happened if this outcome was inevitable?
24 Not only do people believe they would have predicted the actual result
that occurred, they also assume that all others should have been able
to anticipate this "inevitable" result before it happened. 25 Hindsight
bias ultimately reflects a combination of perceived inevitability and
predictability. 2 6 People then project this inevitability and predictability
onto others and believe that reasonable people should have naturally,
anticipated the result that eventually occurred. 27

ECONOMIC DECISIONS 31, 31 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2004) ("The hindsight bias
is the tendency to believe that one's predictions of events as more accurate than they actually
were." (citing Fischhoff, supra note 3, at 288-99; and Fischhoff & Beyth, supra note 5, at 1-16)).
20. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 799; see also Teichman, supra note 6, at 355 ("The
hindsight bias-or, the 'Monday-morning quarterback' bias, or the 'I knew it all' bias-refers to
the tendency of people to overestimate the probability of an event once they are aware of the fact
that the event has occurred.").
21. Jennifer D. Campbell & Abraham Tesser, Motivational Interpretationsof HindsightBias:
An Individual Difference Analysis, 41 J. PERSONALITY 605, 605 (1983) ("[When individuals learn
the correct answer to a question or the outcome of an event, they are either unable or unwilling to
retrieve that state of uncertainty that characterizes preoutcome judgments.").
22. Fischhoff, supra note 19, at 341.
23. Id. at 347 ("The hindsight research described earlier suggests that we are not only quick
to find order but also poised to feel that we knew it all along in some way or would have been able
to predict the result had we been asked in time.").
24. Id. at 341 ("They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but
also to view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened.").
25. Id. ("People believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better
than was actually the case.").
26. John C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reekers, Evaluation of Auditor
Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 711 (1993)
("Hindsight bias relates to individuals' overestimation of the extent to which a realized outcome
could have been anticipated. That is, individuals systematically overstate the relative inevitability
of an outcome and believe that the 'now realized event' was largely apparent in foresight.").
27. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A PositivePsychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 571-72 (1998) (offering a thorough analysis of potential causes of the bias):
Fischhoff described the bias as follows: "In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate
what could have been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has
happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared 'relatively
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Researchers have advanced different theories to explain why
hindsight bias distorts people's abilities to estimate probabilities in an
ex ante world. Motivational theories suggest that hindsight bias is
driven by some people's desire to live in a world where events are
predictable or by their need to be correct and to have others view them
as intelligent. 28 This is an essentially ego-driven explanation. In
contrast, cognitive theory suggests that people subconsciously
incorporate new information to adjust their probability estimates. 29
While using new information to reevaluate probabilities is logical when
estimating the likelihood of future events, "the hindsight bias consists
of using known outcomes to assess the predictability at some earlier
time of something that has already happened." 30 While scholars debate
the underlying causes of hindsight bias, 3 1 no definitive theory or
consensus yet exists.
Although the source of hindsight bias is unsettled, the fact of
hindsight bias is not. Hindsight bias has been well documented. 32
Researchers have detected hindsight bias in everything from predicting
election results 3 3 to bankruptcies. 34 In total, hindsight bias has been
replicated in well over one hundred studies.3 5 Hindsight bias exists in
inevitable' before it happened. People believe that others should have been able to
anticipate events much better than was actually the case."
(quoting Fischhoff, supra note 19, at 341).
28. Id. at 582; see also Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422, 429 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982)
("One possible attraction of hindsight bias is that it may be quite flattering to represent oneself as
having known all along what was going to happen.").
29. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supranote 19, at 799 (Hindsight bias "occurs because learning an
outcome causes people to update their beliefs about the world. People then rely on these new beliefs
to generate estimates of what was predictable, but they ignore the change in their beliefs that
learning the outcome inspired."); Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 582 ("Finally, the cognitive theory
proposes that learning an outcome alters what people believe about the world in ways that make
the known outcome seem inevitable.").
30. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 803.
31. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 584 ("Motivational explanations thus being
inadequate, the hindsight bias must be the product of the thought process that people use to make
judgments in hindsight.").
32. Id. at 571 ("Beginning with the work of Baruch Fischhoff, psychologists have
demonstrated repeatedly that people overstate the predictability of past events-a phenomenon
that psychologists have termed the 'hindsight bias.' ").
33. See, e.g., J. L. Powell, A Test of the Knew-It-All-Along Effect in the 1984 Presidential
Statewide Elections, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 760-73 (1988); see also M. R. Leary, Hindsight
Distortion and the 1980 PresidentialElection, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 257-63
(1982).
34. See, e.g., Thomas A. Buchman, An Effect of Hindsight on PredictingBankruptcy with
Accounting Information, 10 ACCT. ORG. & SOC. 267 (1985).
35. Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fabian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Metaanalysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 147-48 (1991) (noting the
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educated populations and professions, including among judges,
surgeons, physicians, nurses, psychologists, auditors, and military
leaders. 36 Ultimately, "hindsight bias has produced enough research to
allow some tentative general statements: It appears to be quite robust
and widespread." 37
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this Article,
studies have demonstrated that hindsight bias distorts decisionmaking
in actual court cases. 38 Hindsight bias can affect legal analysis because
many legal questions require factfinders to estimate probabilities from
the perspective of an earlier time. By the time a case reaches trial, the
event has either occurred or not. But if factfinders use the ultimate
outcome to determine the ex ante probabilities of its occurrence, they
are not putting themselves in the position of the relevant party who was
making important decisions at the earlier time without knowledge of
the outcome. Yet this is the vantage point from which the factfinder is
supposed to be operating. Taking current knowledge and projecting it
retroactively onto litigants results in legal decisions tainted by
hindsight bias. Most infamously, in one historical case, a 1931 New
Jersey court penalized an estate's executors for not immediately selling
the testator's stocks because, the court asserted, "It was common
knowledge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies, but the
general public as well, that the stock market condition at the time of
testator's death was an unhealthy one, that values were very much

existence of 128 studies documenting hindsight bias); Teichman, supra note 6, at 355 ("The basic
result of Fischhoff (1975) has been replicated in dozens of studies."); see also Rachlinski, supra
note 27, at 580 ("Virtually every study on judging in hindsight has concluded that events seem
more predictable than they actually are.").
36. Fischhoff, supra note 28, at 430 (noting studies finding hindsight bias in surgeons,
physicians, and nurses); see also Hal R. Arkes, David Faust, Thomas J. Guilmette & Kathleen
Hart, Eliminating the HindsightBias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 306 (1988) (psychologists); Hal
R. Arkes, Robert L. Wortmann, Paul D. Saville, & Allan R. Harkness, Hindsight Bias Among
Physicians Weighing the Likelihood of Diagnoses, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252, 253 (1981)
(physicians); Raanon Lipshitz & Dalya Barak, Hindsight Wisdom: Outcome Knowledge and the
EvaluationofDecisions, 88 AcTA PSYCHOLOGICA 105, 121-23 (1995) (officers in the Israeli defense
forces). Regarding military leaders and historians, see Fischhoff, supra note 28, at 430 (noting
study that characterized "the congressional investigatory committee following Pearl Harbor as 39
volumes of hindsight bias").
37. Fischhoff, supra note 28, at 431; see Campbell & Tesser, supra note 21, at 606 ("This
research has also demonstrated that the [hindsight bias] effect is robust over a variety of subject
populations, experimental paradigms, and response instructions."); see also Guthrie et al., supra
note 19, at 801 ("[H] indsight bias is one of the most robust cognitive illusions.").
38. Teichman, supra note 6, at 357 ("Cheney and his colleagues (1989) examined 1,004 court
cases alleging anesthesia-related negligence and found that in over 40% of the cases in which
liability was found the physician acted appropriately.").
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inflated, and that a crash was almost sure to occur." 39 This is a textbook
example of hindsight bias with legal implications. 40
More recently, scholars have reported hindsight bias in many
areas of law. For example, patent law provides that to be patentable, a
discovery must not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in the art. 41 By the time of an infringement trial in which patent validity
is contested, however, an invention that was non-obvious at the time of
discovery and patenting may seem obvious in hindsight. Scholars have
documented many instances in patent litigation when hindsight bias
seems to have distorted results in evaluating a patent's validity. 42
Similarly, hindsight bias can affect judicial determinations of
probable cause. Traditionally, judges determine probable cause before
a search warrant is issued-a scenario that presents no risk of
hindsight bias. 4 3 But when exigent circumstances compel police to
conduct a search before obtaining a warrant, the judge must determine
whether probable cause existed prior to the search taking place. 44 The
judge, however, is making this probable cause determination with full
knowledge of whether the search uncovered contraband or other
evidence of illegal activity.45 Knowing that the person seeking to
suppress evidence from the search did, in fact, possess contraband may
put subconscious pressure on judges to find probable cause in

39. In re Chamberlain's Estate, 156 A. 42, 43 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931).
40. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 804 (treating the opinion as infected by hindsight bias
because "the court's ex post assessment of the ex ante likelihood of the crash was influenced by
being aware of the crash.").
41. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
42. See generally Scott R. Conley, Irrational Behavior, Hindsight, and Patentability:
Balancing the "Obviousto Try" Test with Unexpected Results, 51 IDEA 271 (2011); Jun Wu, Note,
Rewinding Time: Advances in Mitigating Hindsight Bias in Patent Obviousness Analysis, 97 KY.
L.J. 565 (2008-2009).
43. Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword: The Death of Probable Cause, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i,
viii (2010) ("[W]arrants require judges to gauge probable cause before knowing what, if anything,
will be found. Warrants thus avoid the problem of 'hindsight bias.' ").
44. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable Cause,
Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 73 (2011) (explaining judges' ex post
review of searches conducted under the various exigency exceptions to the general warrant
requirement).

45. Id. at 73 ("When searches conducted without a warrant produce incriminating evidence
to be used against a criminal defendant, the judge must assess probable cause in full knowledge
that the search uncovered incriminating evidence.").
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hindsight. 46 The Supreme Court has recognized this risk. 47 Much
evidence suggests that hindsight bias can affect probable-cause
determinations. 48 This could lead to judges approving searches in
retrospect that they would not have approved in foresight,4 9 which
creates a strong incentive for police to search first and seek permission
later. Similarly, hindsight bias can affect jury decisions in civil cases
challenging a police officer's allegedly illegal search, with respect to
both liability and damages. For example, if the party subject to the
challenged search did in fact possess contraband, a jury may be less
likely to find the search to have been illegal or may reduce the private
plaintiffs damages.50

'

46. See Teichman, supranote 6, at 358:
The hindsight bias suggests that judges will exhibit a greater tendency to rule in the
latter category of cases that the search was based on a probable cause since their
judgment of the search will be influenced by the fact that in retrospect it turned out to
be justified.;
see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 44, at 73 ("Judging the reasonableness of a police search in
hindsight obviously places great pressure on a judge to side with the police. A judge who refuses
to issue a warrant in foresight impedes police investigation somewhat. But concluding that a
search was unreasonable in hindsight, however, is apt to lead to the suppression of important
evidence against a defendant who likely committed a crime.").
47. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) ("An arrest without a warrant bypasses the
safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead
the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely
to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.").
48. See Taslitz, supranote 43, at viii ("Ample psychological theory and empirical albeit mostly
in other contexts, supports the idea that hindsight bias is at work in the probable-cause
determination."). But see id. at 92 ("These results show that the hindsight bias influenced judges'
assessments of probability, but did not influence their rulings."); Rachlinski et al., supra note 44,
at 73 ("[W]e found when making probable cause determinations, judges do not seem to be
influenced by the hindsight bias.").
49. See Taslitz, supra note 43, at viii:
Simply put, if a suppression court reviewing the constitutionality of a warrantless
search knows that the search uncovered the horribly mutilated body of a torture victim
and a kilo of cocaine, it becomes harder for that court to find that there was no probable
cause. That evidence was found suggests that there was ample reason to believe
beforehand that evidence would be found.;
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1313 (2005) ("If
the hindsight bias affects judges' assessments of probable cause, then judges in hindsight will
admit evidence obtained under circumstances in which police could not have obtained a warrant
in foresight.").
50. See Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing
Attorney ClosingArguments, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 673 (1998) ("In summary, the few empirical
studies examining hindsight bias in a legal context have demonstrated that mock jurors are unable
to set aside the outcome information when rendering a decision."); see also Jonathan D. Casper,
Kennette Benedict & Janice R. Kelly, Cognitions, Attitudes and Decision-Makingin Search and
Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 93, 111 (1988) ('The evidence presented here lends
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Hindsight bias has been particularly well studied and
documented in many areas of negligence law. Factfinders are supposed
to determine whether a defendant's actions were negligent before the
accident or misfortune occurred.5 1 In negligence cases, a defendant's
reasonable level of care may seem unreasonable after an accident has
occurred. 52 When juries learn that an accident has occurred, hindsight
"bias can cause judges and juries to find liable even those defendants
who attempted to avoid negligence by undertaking all reasonable
precautions in foresight." 53 This can lead to juries making incorrect
determinations of negligence. 54 Hindsight bias can create the illusion of
negligence in retrospect in a variety of scenarios, including saving-andloans failures,5 5 medical malpractice, 56 and cases involving decisions of

support to the concern that outcome knowledge may influence juror decision-making in tort suits
against officers.").
51. See Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 572 ("Reasonableness must be determined from the
perspective of the defendant at the time that the precautions were taken, but the hindsight bias
ensures that subsequent events will influence that determination. The law relies on a process that
assigns liability in a biased manner."); David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to
Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary
Observations, 7 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 485, 499 (1989) ("In a negligence case, juries are supposed to
evaluate the risk and reasonableness of the defendant's behavior in light of the danger that was
or should have been apparent to the actor in the circumstances, not by hindsight in light of the
consequences." (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 170 (5th ed. 1984))).
52. See Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 572 ("The defendant's level of care will be reviewed by
a judge or jury who already knows that it proved inadequate to avoid the plaintiffs injury.
Consequently, the defendant's level of care will seem less reasonable in hindsight than it did in
foresight." (citing Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: DeterminingLiability
in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 89, 101 (1995))).
53. Id. at 572.
54. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1524 (1998) ("Hindsight bias will lead juries making negligence
determinations to find defendants liable more frequently than if cost-benefit analysis were done
correctly-that is, on an ex ante basis.").
55. See Stallard & Worthington, supra note 50, at 681 ("Specifically, participants learning of
the S&L's failure (hindsight condition) tended to believe the board of directors should not have
instituted their new business plan, found the directors negligent, and predicted the S&L would
fail more often than those subjects not given the outcome of the S&L (foresight condition).").
56. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 630 (1994) (comparing the perceived
assumption of risk by shareholders who suffer injury from business decision with patients who
suffer medical injuries); see also Robert A. Caplan, Karen L. Posner & Frederick W. Cheney, Effect
of Outcome on Physician Judgments ofAppropriatenessof Care, 265 J. AM. MED. ASs'N 1957, 1957
(1991):
Over the past several years, we have accumulated data suggesting that the severity of
an adverse outcome may influence a peer reviewer's opinion of the appropriateness of
care. These data have been derived from our investigation of adverse anesthetic
outcomes collected from the closed claims files of a nationwide group of US professional
liability insurance carriers.;
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mental health professionals.5 7 In the latter context, the threat of
hindsight bias in jurors can lead to "unnecessary hospitalization" of
patients as doctors try to minimize the probability of jurors judging
them negligent in hindsight.5 8 In short, the scholarly literature
demonstrates the effect of hindsight bias in a variety of negligence
cases.59
Ultimately, hindsight bias can affect all the major participants
in the litigation process. Witnesses predicting probability can be
influenced by hindsight bias.6 0 Hindsight bias prevents jurors from
properly calculating probabilitieS 6 1 and may make "juries believe that
litigants should have predicted events that no one could have
predicted." 62 And several studies have shown judges to be prone to
hindsight bias in several contexts. 63

#

(citing F. W. Cheney, K. Posner, R.A. Caplan & R.J. Ward, Standard of Care and Anesthesia
Liability, 261 JAMA 1599 (1989)); id. ("We conclude that knowledge of the severity of outcome can
influence a reviewer's judgment of the appropriateness of care.").
57. Wexler & Schopp, supra note 51, at 485-87.
58. Id. at 486-87:
What Poythress did not mention, but what is to us as troubling as the possible injustice
of holding malpractice defendants to an unrealistically high standard of care, is the real
possibility that releasing authorities will adjust to juror 20/20 hindsight by adopting
highly restrictive discharge practices, resulting in a marked increase in false positive
determinations of dangerousness and in the unwarranted deprivation of patient liberty.
In therapeutic jurisprudence terms, such an alteration in discharge practice would
constitute law-caused unnecessary hospitalization. The unnecessary hospitalization
would occur through the operation of a rule of law (the negligence standard) in the
procedural context of an ordinary negligence trial.
59. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 54, at 1523-24:
Hindsight bias also appears to occur in the specific context of negligence
determinations. In the negligence studies, subjects in the role of jurors-armed with
knowledge that harm had in fact occurred-were found to attach significantly higher
probabilities to harm than subjects in the role of ex ante decisionmakers-those not
informed of the occurrence of harm.
(citing Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post & Ex Ante, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995);
and Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinationsof Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996)).
60. See Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 6, at 318 ("[W]itnesses' and practitioners' testimony
and conclusions are biased by their knowledge of the outcomes of chains of relevant events.").
61. Jolls et al., supra note 54, at 1522 ("Because of the hindsight bias ... juries will have
difficulty making probability estimates. . . .").
62. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 780 (citing Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W.
Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive
Damages, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 597, 609 (1999); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post
Ex Ante: DeterminingLiability in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995); Susan J. LaBine
& Gary LaBine, Determinationsof Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 501,
510-12 (1996); and Stallard & Worthington, supra note 50, at 680-81).
63. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 19, at 803 ("[Jjudges exhibited a predictable
hindsight bias; when they learned that a particular outcome had occurred, they were much more
likely to identify that outcome as the most likely to have occurred."); id. at 804 (first citing John
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II. HINDSIGHT BIAS IN ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
Although hindsight bias has been researched and documented
in many fields of law, it has never been thoroughly analyzed in the
context of antitrust law. 6 4 This is surprising because important
antitrust causes of action often ask factfinders to consider ex ante
probabilities at an ex post time-a situation that creates an inherent
risk of hindsight bias. This Part discusses the potential for and reality
of hindsight bias in antitrust litigation.
A. Attempted Monopolization
Section Two of the Sherman Act condemns both actual
monopolization and attempted monopolization. Actual monopolization
is illegal when a firm uses anticompetitive conduct to acquire or
maintain a monopoly. 65 This Article instead focuses on attempted
monopolization. Antitrust law is not unique in condemning misconduct
that fails to achieve the wrongdoer's goal. Many areas of substantive
law punish attempted crimes and violations in order to deter the
underlying misconduct, whether the attempt succeeds or not. 6 6 In
antitrust law, attempted monopolization claims can be brought by
either government officials or private plaintiffs. In Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan,67 the Supreme Court created a three-element test for
attempted monopolization: "(1) . . the defendant has engaged in
predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
power." 6 8 Private plaintiffs must also show that they have suffered
antitrust injury caused by the defendant's illegal anticompetitive
C. Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation
Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 730 (1993); then citing W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think
About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 55 (1999); and then citing Marianne M. Jennings et al.,
Outcome Foreseeability and Its Effects on Judicial Decisions (unpublished manuscript)) ("[Olur
findings are consistent with other studies showing that judges are vulnerable to the hindsight
bias.").
64. See Christopher R. Leslie, RationalityAnalysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (2010)
(briefly discussing hindsight bias in the context of predatory pricing conspiracies).
65. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (reciting the legal
definition of the offense of monopoly under the Sherman Act).
66. See Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker, Attempted Monopolization: Reuniting a
Doctrine Divorced from Its Criminal Law Roots and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 73 MARQ. L.
REV. 355, 381 (1990) ("One major function of the attempt crime is prevention. To prevent the
commission of a substantive offense, the law needs a basis to intervene before the actor actually
has committed the completed crime.").
67. 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
68. Id. at 456 (citing 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 820, at 312 (1978)).
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conduct. 69 Because this Article focuses on the role of prediction in
antitrust analysis, the third element of the Spectrum Sports test is the
most relevant for the purposes of this Article.7 0 Antitrust law requires
plaintiffs to prove a dangerous probability that the defendant will
achieve monopoly power in order to prevent Section Two from being a
garden-variety unfair competition statute.7 1
The major distinction between actual monopolization and
attempted monopolization is that the former targets successful
monopolization achieved through anticompetitive conduct while the
latter condemns failed attempts to acquire actual monopoly power. By
definition, attempted monopolization is "an unsuccessful attempt to

69. See, e.g., SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th
Cir. 1996) (including "causal antitrust injury" as an element of attempted monopolization).
70. Before Spectrum Sports, commentators debated whether a dangerous probability of
monopolization was an element at all. See Roszkowski & Brubaker, supra note 66, at 356 ("The
central controversy is whether 'dangerous probability of success' should be an element of an
attempt to monopolize, and if so, what constitutes a dangerous probability of successful
monopolization. Legal commentators have lined up on both sides of the issue .... ).
The third element of the Spectrum Sports test is analogous to the monopoly power element of
the Grinnell test. (Like the monopoly power element of monopolization claims, the dangerous
probability element is often analyzed first even though it is technically listed third. See In re Int'l
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 407 (1984).) Both elements require the plaintiff to define the
relevant market over which the defendant possesses monopoly power (in the case of actual
monopolization) or enjoys "a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power" (in the case of
attempted monopolization). Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456. Proof of actual power or probable
power generally entails analysis of the defendant's market share and any barriers to entry into
that market. Although the analytical framework is the same, actual monopolization requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant actually possesses a dominant market share; in contrast,
attempted monopolization claims can succeed when the defendant does not possess a monopoly
market share, U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 1000 (11th Cir. 1993), so long
as a dangerous probability existed that the defendant would monopolize the market. Spectrum
Sports, 506 U.S. at 456 ("In order to determine whether there is a dangerous probability of
monopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider the relevant market and the defendant's
ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market.").
71. Horst v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 739, 742 (D. Colo. 1996) ("Courts insist
that such a showing [of dangerous probability of monopolization] be made because otherwise the
Sherman Act could unwittingly be expanded into an unfair competition statute."); see also Int'l
Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that the
dangerous probability of monopolizing element prevents Section 2 from discouraging healthy
competition).
The Fifth Circuit has explained that the "distinction between unfair conduct and
anticompetitive conduct is critical to maintain because the antitrust laws 'do not create a federal
law of unfair competition or purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons
engaged in interstate commerce.'" Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d
883, 892 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 225 (1993)); see also Military Servs. Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants of Va., Ltd., 823 F.2d
829, 832 n.4 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[C]ourts should be circumspect in converting ordinary business torts
into violations of antitrust laws" because it was "not the intent of the antitrust laws" "to 'create a
federal common law of unfair competition.'" (citation omitted)).
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achieve monopolization." 7 2 Because the attempt to monopolize
constitutes a separate and distinct basis for antitrust liability, "the
Sherman Act's prohibition against attempted monopolization does not

73
require that the attempt in fact ripen into an actual monopoly."

Indeed, plaintiffs generally bring attempted monopolization claims
instead of solely pursuing actual monopolization claims precisely
because the defendant's conduct failed to create monopoly power.74
In theory, courts can look at many factors in determining the
defendant's probability of monopolizing the market, including market
trends, barriers to entry, and the number and strength of rivals.75 But
courts tend to focus on the defendant's market share. 76 This raises the
issue of the relevant time period in which to consider that market share.
This dangerous probability of success must be calculated at the
time that the defendant began engaging in the challenged
anticompetitive conduct.77 For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held
72. Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 474 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[A]ttempted
monopolization claim necessarily involves conduct which has not yet succeeded. . . ."); Multiflex,
Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 990 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Mowery v. Standard Oil Co.
of Ohio, 463 F. Supp. 762, 772 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd, 590 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Of course by
definition an Attempt to monopolize pertains to an unsuccessful monopolist, so the mere fact that
plaintiff failed to show that the defendant possessed monopoly power in the relevant market does
not dispose of plaintiffs claim of attempted monopoly.").
73. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co. (Lektro-Vend 11), 660 F.2d 255, 270 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971)).
74. See Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 542 (E.D. Tex.
2004) ("An attempted monopolization claim necessarily involves conduct which has not yet
succeeded; otherwise, the plaintiff would bring an actual monopolization claim.").
75. Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 162 (10th Cir. 1986).
76. U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 999 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The principal
measure of actual monopoly power is market share, and the primary measure of the probability of
acquiring monopoly power is the defendant's proximity to acquiring a monopoly share of the
market."); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982) ("In
order to be found liable for attempted monopolization, a firm must possess market strength that
approaches monopoly power-the ability to control prices and exclude competition. Market strength
is often indicated by market share."); see, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421,
1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant's market share of forty-four percent is sufficient
to show a dangerous probability of monopolization, if there are barriers to entry and expansion);
Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir.
1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that "the jury could reasonably have concluded that
defendants had a dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly power" in part because "[d]uring
the period in which defendants engaged in predatory pricing, their market share was above 55%");
Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1102
(D. Colo. 2004) ("A market share of 41% indicates that a firm has substantial economic power in
the market, and, therefore, has the tools at its disposal to elevate its market share to monopolistic
levels." (citing Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694 (10th
Cir. 1989))).
77. See HDC Med., Inc. v. Minntech Corp., 474 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Dangerous
probability of successes 'should be evaluated as of when the alleged anticompetitive events
occurred.'" (citation omitted)); U.S. Anchor Mfg., 7 F.3d at 994 ("In analyzing attempted
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that "[w]hen determining whether an issue of fact exists as to whether
defendant's actions presented a dangerous probability of defendant
achieving a monopolist's market power, a court examines the relevant
market and defendant's market power before the attempt to monopolize
began."7 8 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that the dangerous

probability of monopolization elements "should be evaluated as of when
the alleged anticompetitive events occurred." 79 This principle is well
established in antitrust law.80 Courts should not analyze the dangerous
probability element in hindsight. The Fifth Circuit has explained that
"[w]hen evaluating the element of dangerous probability of success, we
do not rely on hindsight but examine the probability of success at the
time the acts occur."8 1 State courts, too, have recognized that "the time
to analyze whether there is a dangerous probability of monopolization
is when the acts occur, not in hindsight." 82 The antitrust violation is
complete if the defendant engages in exclusionary conduct with a
specific intent to monopolize under circumstances where "the overt acts,
had they been successful, would have led to control of the market." 83
monopolization's dangerous probability of success element, the estimate of market power is
necessarily speculative to some extent because it requires an evaluation of future behavior by
market participants, viewed at the time the alleged attempt began."); id. at 1000 ("[I]t is usually
necessary to evaluate the prospects for monopolization as they existed when the alleged attempt
began."); Multiflex, 709 F.2d at 992 ("The time to examine 'dangerous probability' is when the acts
occur."); Conceptual Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262, 1270
(D.R.I. 1989) ("[Tihe 'dangerous probability' of successful monopolization must be determined as
of the time the acts occurred." (citations omitted)); see also Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'I Publ'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) ("The
[market] share that is relevant for determining whether the defendant can satisfy the 'dangerous
probability of success' requirement of attempted monopolization should be either that which he
possesses at the time of litigation or the largest share he possessed during the period of the alleged
offense." (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

$¶

711.2d, 835.2b.

(Supp. 1994))).
78. McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1505 (11th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
79. Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 807 (8th Cir. 1987).
80. See, e.g., Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e look
to the defendant's conduct and the market at the time the conduct occurred, rather than evaluating
the conduct's effects after-the-fact." (emphasis added)); Int'l Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh
Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1987) ("A dangerous probability of monopoly may exist
where the defendant firm possesses a significant market share when it undertakes the challenged
anticompetitive conduct." (emphasis added)); Cont'l Guest Servs. Corp. v. Int'l Bus Servs., Inc.,
939 N.Y.S.2d 30, 36 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Int'l DistributionCtrs., Inc., 812 F.2d at 791).
81. United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1984).
82. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 563, 592 (Tex.
App. 2007) (citing Multiflex, 709 F.2d at 991).
83. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp. (Lektro-Vend 1), 500 F. Supp. 332, 350 (N.D. Ill. 1980),
affd sub nom., Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at 358; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 785 (1946) (describing attempted monopolization as "the employment of methods, means and
practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though falling short,
nevertheless approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it").
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Recognizing that the attempted monopolization claim condemns
failed efforts that had a dangerous probability of success at the time the
anticompetitive conduct commenced, antitrust law does not allow the
defendant's subsequent lack of monopoly power to exonerate the
defendant's anticompetitive conduct. Courts have made clear that a
defendant's "drop in market share does not defeat an attempted
84
monopolization claim when there is evidence to support the claim."
This makes sense given that the attempted monopolization component
of Section Two of the Sherman Act punishes endeavors, not victories.
Because the attempted monopolization cause of action focuses on failed
attempts to monopolize, the failure to achieve actual monopoly power
does not mean that there was never a dangerous probability of
success.8 5 As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "The fact that a plan
violative of the spirit of the antitrust laws ultimately fails does not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that there was no 'dangerous
probability of success.' "86 More profoundly, the Tenth Circuit observed
that "[s]imply because a plan fails to succeed does not mean there was
no probability that it could have succeeded. A flipped coin which lands
heads still had a 50% chance of landing tails before it was flipped."8 7
1. Courts Invite Hindsight Bias by Examining Subsequent Market
Performance
Despite the rule that factfinders should evaluate the dangerous
probability of monopolization element as of the. time when the
defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct, several courts have
nonetheless invited hindsight bias by examining the defendant's
market performance in the years following its anticompetitive conduct.
Defendants often ask courts to weigh heavily any "subsequent loss of
market share" as "highly relevant" to show their lack of market power. 88

. 84. Multiflex, 709 F.2d at 992 (discussing Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of
Am., Inc., 651 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981)).
85. See Tex. DisposalSys. Landfill, 219 S.W.3d at 592 ("Just because the defendant does not
ultimately achieve a monopoly does not mean there was not a dangerous probability that the
defendant would succeed." (citing Multiflex, 709 F.2d at 991)).
86. Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 807 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The fact
that a plan violative of the spirit of the antitrust laws might ultimately fail does not lead to the
conclusion that there was no dangerous probability of success." (citing Multiflex, 709 F.2d at 992)).
87. Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 697 n.20 (10th Cir.
1989).
88. See, e.g., White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 869, 893 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
("According to the defendants, failure of the alleged monopoly scheme proves there was never any
'dangerous probability' of its success."); Robert's Haw. Sch. Bus, Inc. v. Laupahoehoe Transp. Co.,
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Some courts have accepted these invitations.89 Most notably, the
Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's "subsequent market
performance" is relevant to determining whether defendants in
attempted monopolization cases ever had a dangerous probability of
monopolization.9 0 Several courts have since relied on this Seventh
Circuit precedent to hold that in calculating the probability that the
defendant's anticompetitive conduct would result in monopolization,
factfinders may consider "the defendant's subsequent market
performance," among other variables. 91
Courts have proffered several reasons why the defendant's
subsequent market performance may be relevant in attempted
monopolization cases. Some courts treat subsequent market
performance as relevant to the defendant's "capacity to monopolize." 92
While noting that "actual effects are not by themselves necessary to
sustain an attempted monopolization claim," the Fifth Circuit has
nonetheless asserted that the "actual effects of a defendant's conduct
might be relevant to determining its predatory nature, the defendants'
intent, or the state of the market." 93 The court did not elaborate on the
reasoning behind its assertion. Lower courts have nevertheless

91 Haw. 224, 255-56 (1999) (explaining the defendant's argument for the relevance of a
subsequent loss of market share).
89. Some courts, however, correctly decline such invitations. For example, in In re Mushroom
Direct PurchaserAntitrust Litig., 514 F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D. Pa. 2007), the defendants faulted the
plaintiffs' complaint for "contain[ing] no allegations regarding subsequent market performance,
which'belies any dangerous probability of successful monopolization.' " Id. at 701. While the court
did not hold such evidence to be irrelevant-as it should have-the judge did conclude that "the
absence of allegations concerning subsequent market performance is not sufficient as a basis for a
motion to dismiss." Id.
90. Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at 270-7 1:
A subsequent failure to achieve monopoly status cannot itself vitiate a claim of
attempted monopoly where other evidence substantially supports the attempt without
eviscerating the entire attempt offense. But Kearney does not forbid consideration of
subsequent market performance to evaluate the existence of the alleged attempt as the
plaintiffs contend.
91. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1474 (E.D.
Wis. 1987), aff'd, 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989):
In evaluating whether it was possible for the defendant to achieve its goal of monopoly
power at the time the alleged anticompetitive events occurred, the court can consider:
the defendant's market power, including sales and profits; the defendant's subsequent
market performance; the size and number of competitors in the market; increasing or
decreasing concentration within the relevant market; and the defendant's capacity to
control prices and exclude competitors.
92. Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at 271 ("We agree with the district court that Vendo's market
performance subsequent to the alleged attempts, while by no means dispositive, is at least relevant
to Vendo's capacity to monopolize at the time of the supposed attempts.").
93. Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 474-75 (5th Cir. 2000).
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interpreted the Fifth Circuit's language as "recogniz[ing] that such
evidence" of the attempted-monopolization defendant's lack of success
"may be relevant, considered with other factors, to show that there was
no dangerous probability of success at the time the predatory scheme
occurred." 94 While claiming to apply the correct legal standard-of
examining the probability at the time of predation-the court's
language reflects the classic hindsight-bias trap of using post-event
facts to measure pre-event probabilities.
Courts have apparently sought to honor the rule that Section
Two condemns certain would-be monopolists by holding that evidence
of subsequent market performance is not dispositive; the evidence is
merely "relevant and admissible." 95 This distinction, however, is
probably not sufficient, given the nature of cognitive biases. 96 Hindsight
bias may trump any rule that renders subsequent market performance
nondispositive because factfinders may subconsciously treat the
subsequent market performance as dispositive even if they know that
they are not supposed to do so. 97 Put simply, to examine subsequent

market performance is to invite hindsight bias.
2. Examples of Hindsight Bias in Attempted Monopolization Cases
Despite courts claiming that they will not treat subsequent
market performance as dispositive, attempted monopolization
jurisprudence is littered with examples of courts falling victim to
hindsight bias. This hindsight bias is sometimes explicit, but is often
subtle. This Section reviews both forms, including examples of courts
finding that the plaintiffs could not possibly prove that the defendant
had a dangerous probability of monopolizing the market because
market entry occurred after the defendant began its anticompetitive
conduct. Many courts concentrate on a defendant's subsequent loss of
market share, even if that decline occurred after the attempted

94. GMA Cover Corp. v. Saab Barracuda LLC, No. 4:10-CV-12060, 2012 WL 642739, at *9
n.6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-CV-12060, 2012 WL
639528 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2012).
95. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 n.11 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The
precipitous decline, beginning in 1976, of Kodak's share of the camera market was evidence that
the jury could consider, although it was not dispositive."); Robert's Haw. Sch. Bus, Inc. v.
Laupahoehoe Transp. Co., 91 Haw. 224, 255-56 (1999) ("We agree with appellees that subsequent
performance is relevant and admissible; however, subsequent market performance is not
dispositive.").
96. Courts seem to conflate relevant and admissible even though relevant evidence may be
inadmissible due to its prejudicial effect. See infra notes 335-337 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text.
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monopolization claim has been filed, including market share declines at
the time of trial. As well as examining the defendant's post-conduct
market situation, many courts rely on the plaintiffs eventual survival
as dispositive evidence that the defendant could not have monopolized
the market.
In some cases, courts are almost explicit in their hindsight bias.
In Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., the plaintiff challenged the
defendant's imposition and enforcement of illegal restrictive covenants
as an attempt to monopolize the relevant market of coin-operated
vending machines for the sale of food, beverages, and cigarettes in the
United States.9 8 Although the challenged conduct occurred in 1959, the
court focused on the defendant's declining market share in the early
1960s through the mid-1970s.9 9 In doing so, the district court opined
that "rather than speculating as to what would happen in the future (as
most courts must of necessity do in evaluating alleged attempts to
monopolize), this court has the benefit of observing what actually
happened in the marketplace. [The defendant] did not achieve a
monopoly or come dangerously close."100 This is the very definition of
hindsight bias: the court explicitly used the actual outcome to conclude
that the ex ante probability of monopolization was impermissibly low.
The court said that the defendant's failure was "not dispositive" but
then essentially treated it so. 101

Other courts have similarly exhibited overt hindsight bias. For
example, the First Circuit has held that even though a defendant's
probability of monopolization should be calculated as of the time of its
anticompetitive conduct, "later effects sometimes indicate the nature of
that potential.... We would find attempt claims presumptively
implausible if the challenged conduct has been in place for at least two
years and the remaining market remains robustly competitive as
evidenced by ongoing entry, profitability of rivals, and stability of their

98. Lektro-Vend I, 500 F. Supp. at 350.
99. Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at 270.
100. Lektro-Vend I, 500 F. Supp. at 356 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 356. On appeal, the plaintiff pointed out that in analyzing an attempted
monopolization claim the court should not rely on the defendant's post-conduct market shares.
Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at 270. Although the Seventh Circuit correctly observed that the
defendant's "subsequent failure to achieve monopoly status" was not dispositive, it nevertheless
reasoned that the defendant's "market performance subsequent to the alleged attempts ... [was]
at least relevant to [its] capacity to monopolize at the time of the supposed attempts." Id. at 271.
In affirming the district court's hindsight-riddled opinion, the Seventh Circuit, too, relied heavily
on the defendant's loss of market share in the several years after its challenged conduct. Id.
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aggregate market share.' "102 Some courts seem to expect-or requirethat anticompetitive conduct will result instantly or rapidly in actual
monopolization and treat the failure to do so as proof that no dangerous
probability of monopolization ever existed. 103 Other courts have opined
that no dangerous probability of monopolization exists unless the
plaintiff presents evidence that the defendant was, in fact, "able to
exclude actual or potential competition" from the relevant market. 104 In
so holding, courts are essentially saying that factfinders must use ex
post outcomes to determine ex ante probabilities. This approach
effectively mandates hindsight bias.
Antitrust opinions exhibit potential hindsight bias in attempted
monopolization cases in several ways. For example, some courts commit
hindsight bias by asking whether any market entry occurred after the
defendant began its anticompetitive conduct. 105 More commonly, courts
often hold that if the defendant's market share decreased after the
defendant began engaging in anticompetitive conduct, then there could
not have been a dangerous probability of monopolization. For example,
in McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., the plaintiff challenged the
defendant's alleged predatory pricing as an attempt to monopolize the
market in propane in some areas of Georgia. 1 0 6 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the
defendant's market share declined during the two years following the
below-cost pricing. The court reasoned that "such declines [are]
evidence that an alleged attempt to monopolize is not dangerously close

102. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Can. Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 807f, at 360-61 (1996)).
103. Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[The plaintiff]
characterizes the alleged violation as an attempt to monopolize, although presumably, if his theory
were valid, as soon as the termination becomes effective, the attempt would ripen into a completed
monopolization." (emphasis added)).
104. Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577, 590 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding that "since there was no
evidence that [defendants] were able to exclude actual or potential competition," there was no
"dangerous probability of achieving monopolization in a relevant market").
105. One district court recently granted summary judgment to an attempted monopolization
defendant, in part, because "a jury could not reasonably find there was a dangerous probability
that defendant would monopolize the market ... [because d]uring the time period in question, at
least one competitor ... was able to enter the market." Savory Pie Guy, LLC v. Comtec Indus.,
Ltd., No. 14 CV 7527 (VB), 2016 WL 7471340, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2016).
106. 658 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ga. 1987), rev'd, 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988). The Eighth
Circuit reversed, noting that it was "'undisputed' that [the defendant] had sixty or sixty-five
percent of the relevant market when the alleged predatorypricing began." McGahee, 858 F.2d at
1506 (emphasis added). Such a market share, the court held, was "a sufficiently large platform
from which such a scheme could be launched to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether there was a dangerous probability that Northern Propane would succeed in achieving a
monopoly." Id. The appellate court, in other words, did not fall into the hindsight-bias trap.
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to success. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that defendant
attempted to achieve a monopoly through predatory price cuts, the
Court finds no evidence that such a scheme had a dangerous probability
of success."1 0 Many courts have similarly treated the defendant's
subsequent loss of market share as sufficient to defeat an attempted
monopolization claim. 108
Many courts commit hindsight bias by focusing on the
defendant's market share after antitrust litigation is filed. For example,
in Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., the Second
Circuit affirmed dismissal of a plaintiffs attempted monopolization
claims. 109 When the defendant began its allegedly anticompetitive
conduct, it had a market share of 54.5 percent.1 1 0 The following year,
the plaintiff went out of business and, one year later, it filed its
attempted monopolization claim against the defendant.1 11 Yet the court
used the defendant's decline in market share up to three years after the
antitrust complaint had been filed to conclude that no reasonable jury
could find that the defendant had a dangerous probability of
monopolizing the market when it began engaging in anticompetitive
conduct. 112 This represents hindsight bias because the question of.
whether the defendant possessed a dangerous probability of
monopolization should have been answered in the context of the
defendant's 54.5 percent market share-which was sufficiently high to
satisfy the dangerous probability element 1 13 -not from the perspective
of the state of the market several years into the litigation. Similarly, in
Advisory Information & Management Systems, Inc. v. Prime Computer,
107. McGahee, 658 F. Supp. at 196-97 (citation omitted).
108. See, e.g., Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1431 (6th Cir.
1990) ("The limestone market share of defendants was, at most, around thirty percent and
decreasing.... There is no substantial evidence that defendants were capable of, much less
achieved, the destruction of competition in limestone in any relevant market."); Advanced HealthCare Servs., Inc. v. Giles Memorial Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 494 (W.D. Va. 1994) ("If the
defendants' market share is declining and/or other competitors' market shares are rising, then the
defendants can hardly possess monopoly power."); Duke v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tenn., Inc.,
No. W2005-00146-COA-R3CV, 2006 WL 1491547, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2006) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant because "[t]here is no evidence in the record to refute [the]
assertion that [the defendant's] market share actually declined during the relevant period"); see
also Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting
that defendant's market share declined from approximately 40% to approximately 30%).
109. 614 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1980).
110. Id.
111. The lawsuit also alleged breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and other
non-antitrust claims. Id. at 835.
112. Id. at 841.
113. See, e.g., Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 409 (2d
Cir. 1988) (noting that defendant's "market share was above 55%"), aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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Inc., although the defendant's challenged conduct occurred in 1982, the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment by
invoking market share data from 1984, the year in which the court
actually granted the motion.114 Because the defendant's market share
stable-and did not increase-after its allegedly
remained
anticompetitive conduct, the court concluded that the plaintiff
11 5
It is not
"demonstrated no significant probability of monopolization."
uncommon for courts to invoke a defendant's post-complaint market
share to assert that pre-complaint it had no probability of monopolizing
the market.116 Such use of post-conduct evidence to calculate ex ante
probabilities is the essence of hindsight bias.
Courts also routinely hold that a plaintiffs attempted
monopolization claim must fail as a matter of law if the plaintiff cannot
prove that the defendant currently possesses monopoly power. For
example, in IndianaGrocery Co. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit reviewed an opinion in which the district court held that the
defendant had no dangerous probability of monopolizing the market
because the defendant did not possess the power to control price during
pre-trial discovery. 117 The district judge went on to look at the current
configuration of the relevant market to find no dangerous probability of
monopolization existed in the past because no monopoly existed in the
present.1 1 8 Despite the district court's hindsight reasoning, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the judgment while noting that the market did have
barriers to entry, the market price did increase, and the defendant did
manage to discipline its rivals against engaging in vigorous price
competition. 1 19 This evidence suggests that the defendant may have, in

114. 598 F. Supp. 76, 86, 90 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
115. Id. at 87.
116. See, e.g., Lektro-Vend I, 500 F. Supp. 332 (finding no dangerous probability of
monopolization based on the defendant's market share in 1989 and 1990 even though the antitrust
lawsuit challenged conduct prior to 1988); Allen Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Sons
Co., No. C-69-359, 1972 WL 553, at *13-15 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 13, 1972) (reversing jury verdict in
favor of plaintiff and finding no dangerous probability of success by discussing events in 1970 even
though the claim was filed in 1969).
117. See 864 F.2d 1409, 1410 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g, Ind. Grocery Co. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.,
684 F. Supp. 561, 579 (S.D. Ind. 1988) ("The plaintiffs' evidence on monopoly power comes from
Dr. Marion. When asked at pages 50 to 52 of his deposition, 'Now is it your position that [the
defendant] has the power to control prices in Indianapolis' he replied, 'No.'" (emphasis added)).
118. See Ind. Grocery, 684 F. Supp. at 579 ("Plaintiffs' response is devoid of any evidence that
[the defendant] came dangerously close to acquiring the forbidden monopoly power as there
remains a market with at least two strong participants . . . and other participants ..... (emphasis
added)).
119. Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1415-16.
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fact, achieved monopoly power.1 2 0 If so, the district court committed
hindsight bias while misanalyzing the ex post evidence that it should
not have relied on in the first place. Similarly, the district court in MMK
Group, LLC v. SheShells Co. dismissed the plaintiffs claim that the
defendant illegally attempted to monopolize the market for breast
shield products because the plaintiffs "allegation that [the defendant]
'intends ... to become a dominant competitor' in certain markets is
effectively an admission by [the plaintiff] that [the defendant] does not
yet possess sufficient market power to control prices and exclude
competition."1 2 1 The "power to control prices or exclude competition" is
the classic definition of actual monopoly power.1 22 The fact that the
defendant "does not yet possess" such monopoly powerl 2 3 is not a reason
to dismiss an attempted monopolization claim; it is instead the
hallmark of this antitrust cause of action because if the defendant did
possess monopoly power, the claim would be for actual monopolization,
not attempted monopolization.
In a similar vein, courts sometimes look at the defendant's
market share at the time of the trial in order to hold that no dangerous
probability of success existed at the time the defendant engaged in the
challenged anticompetitive conduct. For example, in Buehler AG v.
Ocrim S.p.A., the district court found that the antitrust defendant had
no dangerous probability of monopolizing the market because its
market share at the time of trial was "legally insignificant."1 24 Likewise,
the Fifth Circuit in Deauville Corp. v. FederatedDepartmentStores, Inc:
affirmed a directed verdict for the antitrust defendant because "[t]he
trial record indicates that at the time of trial [one new competitor] had
opened and [another new competitor] was being planned.... In a
market which would allow such competition there was no dangerous
probability that an attempt to monopolize could succeed."1 25 Again, the
court used ex post outcomes to calculate ex ante probabilities, which is

the definition of hindsight bias.
In addition to discussing the defendant's market situation after
it engaged in anticompetitive conduct, many courts point to a plaintiffs

120. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
121. 591 F. Supp. 2d 944, 962 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
122. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ("Monopoly
power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.").
123. See MMIK Grp., 591 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (emphasis added).
124. 836 F. Supp. 1305, 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd sub nom., 34 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
see infra notes 134-137 and accompanying text (explaining how the court's hindsight bias led to
wrong result in case).
125. 756 F.2d 1183, 1190-92 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
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ultimate profitability, success, or survival as proof that the defendant
never possessed a dangerous probability of monopolizing the market.
For example, the Second Circuit has reasoned that when a plaintiff "has
remained an effective competitor" with the defendant despite the
latter's exclusionary conduct, the plaintiffs "claim of attempted
monopolization is without merit." 126 Less dramatically, the First Circuit
has opined that "where a plaintiff remains profitable and in fact has
expanded its market share since the allegedly anticompetitive conduct
has begun, it faces an uphill battle in proving such a dangerous
probability exists." 12 7 When the defendant's rivals remain profitable in
the market years after the challenged conduct, the First Circuit treats
"presumptively
as
claims
monopolization
attempted
any
128
Other courts routinely treat an antitrust plaintiffs
implausible."
success-or even mere nonclosure-as strong evidence that there was
never a dangerous probability that the defendant could monopolize the
market.129 This is analogous to deciding that the victim injured in an
attempted murder scheme has no cause of action if the intended victim
survives the attack. Such logic makes no sense when one considers that
some targets of anticompetitive conduct remain in business because
they spend resources to thwart the defendant's predation. The attempt
may fail precisely because the plaintiff-competitors targeted by the
anticompetitive conduct have responded and blunted the exclusionary
effect of the defendant's misdeeds by undertaking expensive
countermeasures. 13 0 The would-be monopolist should not be absolved of
131 The
liability after imposing such unnecessary costs on its rivals.
132 That
expenses incurred by the plaintiff constitute antitrust injury.
126. Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1990).
127. Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle, S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 126 (1st Cir. 2011).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Savory Pie Guy, LLC v. Comtec Indus., Ltd., No. 14 CV 7527 (VB), 2016 WL
7471340, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2016) (finding no dangerous probability of monopolizationand granting summary judgment to Defendant-in part because Plaintiff remained in business
after Defendant's allegedly anticompetitive conduct took place); Compuware Corp. v. Int'l Bus.
Machs. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 2d 475, 488 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (same).
130. Cf. Ass'n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577, 585 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("Attempted monopolization consists of a specific intent to acquire monopoly power by means
of exclusionary conduct and a dangerous probability that such conduct, if unchecked, would
produce the desired monopoly." (emphasis added) (citing Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 626-27 (1953); and Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396, 402
(1905))).
131. See Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 992 (5th Cir. 1983) ("We do not
accept the use of hindsight plus evidence of plaintiffs successful response to the defendant's acts
to exonerate an antitrust violator who did cause damage to the plaintiff.").
132. See, e.g., White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co. LLC, 540 F. Supp. 2d 869, 891 (N.D. Ohio
2008) ("White Mule's injuries-loss of sales to third parties due to defendants' assertion of rights
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those countermeasures prove successful does not negate the offense nor
render the money spent on them nonrecoverable.
The fact that a court fell victim to hindsight bias does not
necessarily mean that the court ultimately reached the wrong
conclusion. Even in cases in which judges cite the defendant's postconduct lack of monopolization, other evidence-not tainted by
hindsight bias-may independently warrant rejection of the plaintiffs
attempted monopolization claim. In some cases, courts find that the
defendant never enjoyed a dangerous probability of monopolizing the
market because it had an insufficiently low market share before its
anticompetitive conduct and its market share decreased after it
initiated that conduct. In some markets, regulatory features effectively
prevented any future monopolization. 133
In some opinions that exhibited hindsight bias, however, a
strong case can be made that the bias led the court to improperly
dispose of the case. For example, in Buehler AG v. Ocrim S.p.A., the
court held that if the market were defined as "European roller mills in
the United States,"1 34 then there was no dangerous probability of the
defendant monopolizing the market because the defendant's market,
position had weakened by the year the trial took place. 135 Yet, under
that same market definition, the court had previously noted that the
defendant would possess approximately sixty percent of the relevantunder fraudulently obtained patents; significant attorney's fees and litigation costs in defending
against ATC's patent infringement suit-flow directly from the alleged Walker Process antitrust
violation.").
133. For example, in NationalReporting Co. v. Alderson ReportingCo., the defendant allegedly
attempted to monopolize the market for court reporting in federal tax court by securing an
exclusive contract through predatory bidding during the 1980 open-bid period. 763 F.2d 1020, 1021
(8th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff claimed that it was driven from the market because of the defendant's
below-cost bid, and it sued for attempted monopolization. Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed a district
court verdict in the plaintiffs favor. Id. at 1022. The appellate panel invoked the fact that one year
after its predatory conduct, the defendant lost the exclusive contract because of its poor
performance. Id. at 1025. This smacks of hindsight bias because the court examined whether the
defendant's conduct actually enabled it to price like a monopolist and, finding it did not, held that
there was no dangerous probability of monopolization. But the Eighth Circuit's ultimate holding
was probably correct, as the court also noted that the tax court had a policy of requiring its courtreporting contracts to undergo a re-bidding process if the current provider sought to raise prices,
which meant that the defendant "could not control prices, because if it tried to raise its price, the
contract would again be up for bids." Id. at 1023. Given that the tax court's policy successfully
prevented unchecked monopoly pricing, any hindsight bias on the part of the Eighth Circuit panel
resembles harmless error.
134. 836 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (N.D. Tex. 1993) ("A roller mill is a machine in a flour mill that
grinds raw wheat or other grains in the production of flour."), affd sub nom, 34 F.3d 1080 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
135. Id. at 1326 ("The evidence clearly shows a trend of increased entries to the market, a
strengthening showing by the sellers already there, and, at least for this year, a weakening
showing by Plaintiffs.").
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market.136 That should be sufficient to create a dangerous probability
of monopolization. 137 Similarly, some courts have held that there is no
dangerous probability of monopolization where the defendant's "market
share has remained stable and low, despite its anticompetitive acts and
objectives." 1 38 This framing concedes that the defendant has engaged in
anticompetitive conduct with an anticompetitive intent and yet
exonerates the defendant from antitrust liability if the conduct
ultimately failed to achieve the defendant's improper goal.
Compounding the problem of hindsight bias, sometimes courts
misread the significance of the post-conduct evidence that they are
considering. In 1987, Barr Laboratories sued Abbott Laboratories for
illegally attempting to monopolize the market for erythromycin, an oral
antibiotic for adults. 139 Barr accused Abbott of entering exclusive
dealing arrangements, engaging in price discrimination, and refusing
to sell necessary inputs, all in an effort to exclude competitors. 140 The
14
district court granted summary judgment to the defendant. 1 In
affirming the district court's decision and finding that the defendant
pharmaceutical company "did not have a reasonable probability of
successfully monopolizing the adult oral erythromycin market," 142 the
Third Circuit relied on data about market conditions in 1990, three
years after the plaintiff initiated its antitrust lawsuit.1 43 The court,
however, did not properly analyze the ex post data. In looking at market
trends from 1984 through 1990, the court misinterpreted the
significance of the evidence. For example, the court described prices as
"stable" despite the fact that prices had increased sixty-two percent
during this period. 144 Not only did prices increase, but so did Abbott's
market share-two percent as measured in unit sales and fourteen
percent as measured in revenue.1 45 All of this data shows that the
defendant was succeeding in its attempt to monopolize the market, but
the court somehow misconstrued this as evidence of failure and
converted that into a low probability of success at the time the

136. Id.
137. See supra note 76.
138. Compuware Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 2d 475, 488 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
139. Barr Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 978 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1992).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 101.
142. Id. at 113.
143. Id. at 103-04.
144. Id. at 104.
145. Id. at 103 ("[Abbott's] market share increased 14%, rising from approximately 45% in
1984 to 59% in 1990.").
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defendant began its anticompetitive conduct. 1 4 6 In cases like these,
courts simultaneously give significant weight to post-conduct evidence
that might be best avoided and misconstrue the significance of that
evidence.
In sum, because hindsight bias makes events seem logical in
retrospect,1 4 7 factfinders may find ex post reasons for why failure to
monopolize makes sense and thus see the failure as inevitable. And
when failure is pre-ordained, there must not have been a dangerous
probability of success and the plaintiffs attempted monopolization
claim must fail. When courts treat the defendant's subsequent failure
as evidence that the failure was "'relatively inevitable' before it
happened," that is the definition of hindsight bias. 148 The above cases
represent examples of quintessential hindsight bias because courts
relied upon facts subsequent to the time at which they were supposed
to make their probability determination in order to calculate earlier
probabilities. Of course, many courts correctly analyze the relevant
evidence to avoid hindsight bias, noting the irrelevance of the
defendant's subsequent loss of market share14 9 or the plaintiffs survival
in the market. 150 Nevertheless, some courts not only examine evidence
in hindsight but misinterpret the evidence. In short, the threat of
hindsight bias is ever present in attempted monopolization litigation. 151

146. The court also mishandled the significance of market entry. The Third Circuit held that
Abbott had "no reasonable probability of success in any attempt to monopolize" because "the
number of manufacturers of erythromycin products increased from twenty-six in 1984 to thirtytwo in 1990." Id. at 113. The court committed two important mistakes. First, of those thirty-two
pharmaceutical companies, the court admitted that "ten had no sales [in 1990], apparently
indicating their exit from the market." Id. at 114. Thus, there was not an increase in market
participants. Second, and more importantly, Abbott's market share increased despite this alleged
new entry. Id. at 111. The primary reason that antitrust cares about new entrants is the
assumption that new competitors will price discipline an actual or would-be monopolist. But these
new firms could not prevent Abbott from behaving like a monopolist. After all, both Abbott's prices
and its market share went up at a time that the Third Circuit claimed that competition was
increasing. Id.
147. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
148. Fischhoff, supra note 19, at 341.
149. See, e.g., Omni Healthcare Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 613CV1509ORL37DAB, 2016
WL 4272164, at *20 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2016).
150. See, e.g., Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co., No. CV-91-2862-LGB(JRX), 1994 WL 746072,
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1994).
151. The cases discussed and cited in this Section necessarily underrepresent the amount of
hindsight bias that occurs in attempted monopolization jurisprudence. In most instances,
hindsight bias will go unrecorded because antitrust judges often do not state what time periods
they are considering in order to conclude that the defendant's anticompetitive conduct did not
create a dangerous probability of actual monopolization. Ultimately, it is impossible to know the
extent to which hindsight bias influences judicial thinking in attempted monopolization cases.
These cases nonetheless demonstrate that it does happen. Given the subconscious nature of
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B. PredatoryPricing
Hindsight bias in antitrust law is not limited to evaluating the
"dangerous probability of success" element of attempted monopolization
claims. It also arises in predatory pricing cases. Predatory pricing is one
form of anticompetitive conduct that can provide the basis for either a
monopolization or attempted monopolization claim, though the latter is
more common. Predatory pricing occurs when a firm charges a price
below its cost in order to drive its competitors from the market (i.e., the
predation phase) and, upon their exit, charge a monopoly price in an
effort to recoup its losses (i.e., the recoupment phase). 152 In Brooke
Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court
articulated a two-element test for illegal predatory pricing: (1) the
defendant charges a price that is below an "appropriate measure" of its
costs, 1 5 3 and (2) the defendant had "a dangerous probability[] of
recouping its investment in below-cost prices." 154 The probability of
recoupment should be determined at the time that the defendant began
engaging in below-cost pricing. 155
Because the antitrust cause of action for predatory pricing asks
factfinders to determine ex ante probabilities, it presents a risk of
hindsight bias. The risk is similar to that demonstrated in attempted
monopolization cases. This is not surprising; although predatory pricing
has its own elements, they map onto the traditional elements of
attempted monopolization. Pricing below cost represents a form of
monopoly (or anticompetitive) conduct, and the dangerous probability
of recoupment operates as an awkward stand-in for dangerous
probability of monopolization. 156

cognitive bias, it is reasonable to believe that it occurs much more often than admitted in judicial
opinions.

152. See Transamerica Comput. Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1384 (9th Cir. 1983)
("Predatory pricing occurs when a company that controls a substantial market share lowers its
prices to drive out competition so that it can charge monopoly prices, and reap monopoly profits,
at a later time.").
153. 509 U.S. 209, 222-23 (1993).
154. Id. at 224.
155. See, e.g., GMA Cover Corp. v. Saab Barracuda LLC, No. 4:10-CV-12060, 2012 WL 642739,
at *10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2012) ("In short, Brooke Group requires a plaintiff asserting predatory
pricing to show that, at the time of the predatory pricing, there was a "dangerous probability" that
[the defendant] could recoup its losses by charging supracompetitive prices after [the plaintiff] was
driven from the market."), report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-CV-12060, 2012 WL
639528 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2012).
156. See Christopher R. Leslie, PredatoryPricingand Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695,
1746-51 (2013) (explaining the difference between a dangerous probability of monopolization and
a dangerous probability of recoupment).
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Courts create the risk of hindsight bias through antitrust
opinions holding that judges evaluating predatory pricing claims should
"explore not only whether recoupment was possible but also whether it
in fact occurred." 15 7 In predatory pricing cases, some federal courts will
dismiss a complaint that alleges a dangerous probability of the
defendant controlling long-term prices "but fails to allege actual
recoupment of losses, or any other facts allowing such an inference."15 8
This standard requires judges to examine recoupment in retrospect.
Similarly, some courts have suggested that an alleged predator's
failure to charge a supracompetitive price in the post-predation period
"does have the 'tendency to make the existence of that dangerous
probability 'less probable than it would be without the evidence.' "159
Examining the post-predation period invites hindsight bias because "it
would be difficult for anyone to conclude both that recoupment had
utterly failed and that [during the predation period, the defendant] had
been likely to succeed." 16 0
The Supreme Court seemed to invite lower courts to evaluate
predatory pricing claims in hindsight in its most recent opinion on the
subject. In Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
Court reviewed a jury verdict in favor of cigarette manufacturer
Liggett, which had sued its rival Brown & Williamson ("B&W") for
predatory pricing in the market for generic cigarettes. 16 1 At trial;
Liggett argued that B&W wanted Liggett to raise the price of its lowThe traditional test for attempted monopolization also requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant possessed a specific intent to monopolize the market. Courts have focused less on the
intent requirement, if at all, for predatory pricing claims. Some courts have required plaintiffs to
show that the defendant had a predatory intent when pricing below cost. See, e.g., McGahee v. N.
Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete
Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982). Others do not. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose
Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the intent requirement
in predatory pricing cases, see Leslie, supra, at 1754-56.
157. Ashkanazy v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1527, 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (discussing
Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1403-04).
158. Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1013 n.3 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (emphasis
added) (dismissing predatory pricing claim for failure to sufficiently plead antitrust injury).
159. GMA Cover, 2012 WL 642739, at *9 n.6 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401). The court did note,
however, that "evidence that [the defendant] was not in fact able to charge a supracompetitive
price does not by itself mean that there was not a dangerous probability that it would be able to
do so at the time of the predatory pricing." Id. Thus, while the court did not treat failure to raise
prices as dispositive, it did hold the evidence to be admissible and probative. Id. at *9. This is
sufficient to invite hindsight bias. The GMA Cover court ultimately relied in part on the
defendant's failure to succeed as "relevant" evidence that the defendant's exclusionary conduct did
not entail a dangerous probability of success. Id. at *32-33.
160. Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity
Than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 401 (1994).
161. 509 U.S. 209, 219 (1993).
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priced generic cigarettes, which were taking significant sales away from
B&W's sales of branded cigarettes. 1 62 In order to coerce Liggett to raise
its prices, B&W itself entered the market for generic cigarettes and
priced below cost, with the implicit threat that B&W would engage in
predatory pricing until Liggett raised the price of its generic cigarettes
sufficiently high that they did not prevent B&W-and other tobacco
firms-from raising the price of branded cigarettes. 163 Thus, B&W
would suffer losses in the generic cigarette market but recoup these
164
losses in the oligopolized market for branded cigarettes.
The Brooke Group Court upheld a directed verdict for B&W
notwithstanding the jury verdict in favor of Liggett. 165 In so holding,
the Court's majority relied heavily on its perceptions of what happened
in the relevant markets after B&W had engaged in below-cost
pricing. 166 Lower courts have interpreted Brooke Group as standing for
the proposition that "as part of inquiry into whether there was a
reasonable possibility of recoupment, [the Supreme Court] examin[ed]
whether the conduct alleged 'in fact produced supracompetitive
prices.' "167 Professor Stephen Calkins has explained that Brooke Group
seems to instruct courts in predatory pricing cases to determine
"whether with hindsight recoupment in fact occurred or would have
occurred but for litigation." 16 8 The Court emphasized the lack of
evidence of actual recoupment and "relied in part on subsequent
events," which Professor Calkins explained "comes close to using
169
hindsight to conclude that recoupment was not likely to succeed."
Although the opinion's hindsight analysis is not explicit, the Court's
examination of subsequent events tainted its decision to overturn the
jury verdict in favor of Liggett.1 70
Taking the Supreme Court's bait, defendants in predatory
pricing sometimes argue that their failure to actually recoup their
losses proves that there was never a dangerous probability of

162. Id. at 217.
163. Id.
164. See Leslie, supra note 156, at 1736-38 (explaining the strategy of recouping predatory
pricing losses through oligopoly pricing).
165. Brooke Grp., 209 U.S. at 243.
166. See id. at 241 ("The inevitable effect of this marketing effort was to expand the segment,
as the new wholesalers recruited retail outlets to carry generic cigarettes.").
167. GMA Cover, 2012 WL 642739, at *9 n.6 (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 233-38).
168. Calkins, supra note 160, at 400.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 400-01 ("Although the Court did not mention post-trial information, it would
be difficult for anyone to conclude both that recoupment had utterly failed and that in 1984 it had
been likely to succeed.").
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recoupment. For example, when the government challenged American
Airlines' pricing strategies against rival discount airlines as predatory
pricing, the airline argued that "American's demonstrated failure to
actually recoup on the core routes during the years after the alleged
predation ended established that recoupment was not dangerously
probable."1 71 This argument is designed to invite hindsight bias.
The court arguably accepted the defendant's invitation. In
granting summary judgment to the defendant, the court emphasized
that the government expert's calculations "demonstrate that no
substantial recoupment has occurred." 172 Although the government
argued that recoupment had taken place on some airline routes, the
district court concluded that the defendant had "failed to generate
sufficient 'recoupment' to satisfy the 'losses' it supposedly incurred." 173
In particular, the district court emphasized that American had "failed
to recoup its supposed losses" more than three years after its targeted
rival had been driven from the Dallas-Colorado Springs route. 1 7 4
Looking at the four routes that formed the basis of the government's
case in the aggregate, the district court stated that "American incurred
predatory losses of some $41 million on the four routes. Yet, after years
of supposed supra-competitive pricing, it has earned back about a
quarter of this amount, with a current negative 'net sacrifice' still in
excess of $30 million."17 5 Given the lack of actual recoupment, the court
concluded that "[tihis is not predation as defined by Brooke Group."176
But predation-in the form of below-cost pricing-likely occurred if the
defendant lost more than $40 million on the routes. While recoupment
might not have occurred-yet-that does not mean that American
Airlines had no reasonable probability 'of recoupment at the time that
it used below-cost pricing to drive its rivals from the market. The court's
decision was ultimately tarnished by hindsight bias.17 7
171. See, e.g., Appellees' Brief, United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003),
(No. 01-3203), 2002 WL 32157028.
172. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1213 ("Professor Berry's recoupment analysis as to the DFW-COS route is
consistent under both tests. Both show that American has failed to recoup its supposed losses,
even with the passage of more than three years after Western Pacific left the route.").
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Moreover, the American Airlines court also committed hindsight bias by way of syllogism.
The court held that the predatory pricing plaintiff "must prove on the basis of objective evidence
that a dangerous probability of recoupment exists" and that a defendant's "high market share" is
insufficient evidence because the market may have "low entry barriers and other market factors
rendering monopoly power unlikely." Id. at 1209. The court then asserted that "the most conclusive
evidence of the lack of significant barriers to entry is actual entry." Id. (citing 2A PHILLIP E.
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C. Anticompetitive Conspiracies
Attempted monopolization and predatory pricing claims are
susceptible to hindsight bias, in part, because they require the
factfinder to determine ex ante probabilities in an ex post world. But
even antitrust claims that do not require calculating ex ante
probabilities can induce hindsight bias. Section One of the Sherman Act
condemns agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, such as pricefixing conspiracies.1 7 Unlike attempted monopolization and predatory
pricing claims, "there is no requirement that a conspiracy have a
dangerous probability of success." 179 Even a failed price-fixing
conspiracy violates Section One. 180 Nevertheless, hindsight bias exists
in the evaluation of Section One claims. This Section focuses on a
different-and more insidious-form of hindsight bias, in which courts'

AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

1

420b, at 58 (1996)). This logic invites

hindsight bias by requiring the court to determine whether market entry occurred post-predation
in order to determine whether a dangerous probability of recoupment existed during the predatory
period. (One could argue that the court did not actually commit hindsight bias because it did not
explicitly hold that a lack of actual recoupment proves no dangerous probability of recoupment,
but the defendant did explicitly invite the court to commit this error and much of the court's
language and analysis has the flavor of hindsight bias.)
The court's opinion was burdened by other mistakes as well. For example, the court mistakenly
looked for recoupment only in the city-pair markets where American Airlines allegedly engaged in
below-cost pricing. Id. at 1214 (asserting that "under Brooke Group, the court's recoupment
analysis must be focused on 'an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis
of both the scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant
market.' "(citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226
(1993))). This approach is flawed because a predator can recoup in other markets, including
markets for complementary goods, substitute goods, or replacement goods. See Leslie, supra note
156, at 1720-28; see also Ari Lehman, Eliminating the Below-Cost Pricing Requirement from
PredatoryPricingClaims, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 343, 375 (2005) ("[T]he AMR court found that based
on theoretical market factors there was no reasonable likelihood of success despite evidence
indicating that there had been actual recoupment in at least one market.").
The decision also failed to appreciate that a predator may use below-cost pricing to purchase a
reputation for aggression that will allow the predator to deter entry in other markets even when
it charges a supracompetitive price. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 298-300 (2010).
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal."). Most courts require an antitrust plaintiff bringing price-fixing
claims to prove three elements: (1) an agreement (2) that unreasonably restrains trade and (3) has
an effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
809 F.2d 626, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1987).
179. Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1072 (N.D. Ga. 1994),
opinion amended on reconsideration, No. CIV. A. 1:93-CV299-JTC, 1994 WL 776878 (N.D. Ga.
June 24, 1994); see also U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 1001-02 (11th Cir.
1993) ("There is no requirement, however, that a conspiracy. . . have a dangerous probability of
successfully achieving its objectives.").
180. See infra notes 285-289 and accompanying text.
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hold that if the alleged conspiracy failed to achieve its goals, then the
conspiracy must never have existed in the first place.
The progenitor of hindsight bias in Section One jurisprudence is
the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.18 1 In Matsushita, a group of plaintiffs that
manufactured consumer electronics sold in the United States alleged
that their Japanese competitors formed a predatory pricing conspiracy,
in which the conspirators' supracompetitive prices in the Japanese
market were used to subsidize below-cost prices in the U.S. market. 182
The plaintiffs alleged that the Japanese manufacturers sought to drive
their rivals from the U.S. market through collusive predatory pricing,
so that the Japanese firms could collectively control the U.S. market
through price fixing after they had successfully vanquished the U.S.
suppliers. 183 After describing predatory pricing conspiracies as
irrational-because they require upfront losses with uncertain or
unlikely recoupment 184-and noting the alleged conspiracy had been
ongoing for twenty years,18 5 the Matsushita majority concluded: "The
alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its
asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in
fact exist." 186 Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit's denial of summary judgment to the defendants and held that
the plaintiffs did not have a case as a matter of law. 187
This aspect of the Matsushita opinion is flawed for several
reasons. First, the majority did not adequately consider that the
defendants had, in fact, conspired to take control of the U.S. market
through below-cost pricing but were overconfident and underestimated
how difficult the task would be.188 Second, the majority miscalculated
how recoupment for twenty years of below-cost pricing could occur in
short order. 189 Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this
181. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
182 Id. at 577-78.
183 Id.
184. Id. at 588-89.
185. Id. at 591.
186. Id. at 592; see also Randolph Sherman, The Matsushita Case: Tightened Concepts of
Conspiracy and Predation?, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1987).
187. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597-98.
188. See Leslie, supra note 177, at 313 ("[]t is possible that the Japanese firms initially
predicted that they could corner the U.S. market in far less time, incurring far fewer losses. That
this prediction proved false does not mean . . . that such a conspiracy did not exist as a matter of
law.").
189. See Leslie, supra note 156, at 1719 ("The Court's duration assumption is flawed. The
monopoly profit margin in the recoupment period may often be higher than the loss margin during
the predation period.").
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Article, the Court's reasoning bears the hallmarks of hindsight bias.
Instead of focusing on the plaintiffs' evidence showing price
coordination among the defendants,19 0 the Court fixated on the (alleged)
conspiracy's (alleged) failure and then reasoned backwards. By
emphasizing the fact that in retrospect the defendants had sustained
twenty years of losses, the Matsushita majority assumed that the
plaintiffs' theory required that the Japanese manufacturers had
planned from the very beginning to lose money for two decades before
eliminating the plaintiffs from the U.S. market. In a later opinion, the
Supreme Court asserted that the Matsushita "defendants had every
incentive not to engage in the alleged conduct which required them to
sustain losses for decades with no foreseeable profits." 191 But the Court
only knew that the alleged conspiracy would entail twenty years of
losses in hindsight. The Matsushita Court ultimately relied on ex post
information to hold that the alleged conspiracy was inherently
irrational ex ante and, therefore, must have never occurred. 192
The Matsushita rationale has allowed lower courts to hold that
if an alleged conspiracy has failed, then it is implausible that the
conspiracy ever existed. For example, in one recent case in which the
plaintiff sued its competitors for conspiring to organize a group boycott
against it, the district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment by invoking Matsushitafor the proposition that the
defendants' "failure to achieve the alleged objective is strong evidence
that the conspiracy did not exist." 193 In a similar case in which the
plaintiff alleged both antitrust and other civil conspiracies, the court

190. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Katherine G. Leonard & Shawna J. Sodersten, Summary
Judgment at the Crossroads:The Impact of the Celotex Trilogy, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 21 (1990)
("[T]he Court in Matsushita simply ignored plaintiffs' expert testimony that contradicted the
majority's economic analysis of the case.").
191. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992) (emphasis added).
192. See Leslie, supra note 177, at 313 (describing the hindsight bias in Matsushita); see also
Eugene Crew, Matsushita v. Zenith: The Chicago School Teaches the Supreme Court A Dubious
Lesson, ANTITRUST, Fall 1986, at 11 ("If hindsight shows that defendants failed to profit from their
conspiracy, they will be deemed not to have conspired because it would have been-in the Supreme
Court's words-'economically senseless' to do so."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The
Supreme Court'sShimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 111 n.92 (1988) ("Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Powell makes these
assertions, so important to terminating the case, without a single citation of authority or empirical
evidence to support his view of economic reality.").
193. Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., No. CIV-02-528-C, 2004 WL 7318834, at *24
(W.D. Okla. June 15, 2004), rev'd, 458 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 592 (1986)). The Tenth Circuit reversed but did not call
out the trial judge for hindsight bias. Rather, the appellate panel found that the plaintiff "did
adduce direct evidence of a conspiracy," as well as a plausible economic theory and supporting
circumstantial evidence. Champagne Metals, 458 F.3d at 1082.
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granted summary judgment on the latter. The court pointed to the
plaintiffs growth and quoted Matsushita for the holding that "an
alleged conspiracy's failure to accomplish its aim 'is strong evidence
that the conspiracy does not in fact exist.' "194 Thus, in both antitrust
and non-antitrust contexts, courts rely on Matsushitaand use hindsight
to hold that failed conspiracies do not exist.
Perhaps the strongest example of hindsight bias in the context
of antitrust conspiracies comes from the Eleventh Circuit. In
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, a class of wholesale
purchasers of cigarette products sued the leading tobacco companies for
price fixing. 195 The alleged conspiracy followed "Marlboro Friday"-the
industry term for April 2, 1993, when Phillip Morris dramatically
reduced the price of Marlboro-brand cigarettes. 196 In response, other
tobacco companies reduced their prices. 197 The class argued that Phillip
Morris instigated Marlboro Friday to punish its rivals for previously
reducing their prices and taking market share away from Phillip
Morris. Marlboro Friday represented an attempt by Phillip Morris to
restore its market share and to signal its rivals what would happen if
they ever again reduced their prices.19 8 The price war caused all tobacco
firms to sacrifice profits. However, once the dust had settled from
Marlboro Friday and its aftermath, the defendants engaged in twelve
parallel price increases between 1993 and 2000, which the class argued
were the product of a conspiracy to fix prices. 199
The class sought to prove the conspiracy using circumstantial
evidence. To prove an antitrust conspiracy using circumstantial
evidence, a plaintiff must show two components: (1) conscious
parallelism and (2) plus factors tending to show that the conscious
parallelism was the result of concerted, not independent,
decisionmaking. 200 The defendants' twelve corresponding price
increases established conscious parallelism. The class offered a litany
of plus factors, including engaging in price fixing in other countries,
price signaling, actions against individual interest, collective
194. Color & Design Exhibits, Inc. v. Sign, Display & Allied Crafts Union Local 510, No. C 9220591 JW (EAI), 1995 WL 138587, at *8 n.9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 1995) (quoting Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 592).
195. 346 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).
196. Id. at 1292
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1293.
199. Id. at 1294.
200. Id. at 1301; see also id. at 1302 (explaining that "any showing by appellants that 'tends
to exclude the possibility of independent action' can qualify as a 'plus factor.'" (quoting City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., 158 F.3d 548, 571 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998))).
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monitoring of sales, participation in other nonprice conspiracies, a
market structure conducive to collusion, the history of price fixing in
201
The court,
the tobacco industry, opportunities to conspire, and others.
however, methodically rejected the class's proffered plus factors that
suggested the tobacco firms had fixed prices during the 1993 to 2000
period. 202
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the Eleventh
Circuit further held that "even if the class had created an inference of
conspiracy" through the use of plus factors, the inability of the alleged
203
The
cartel to achieve its goals would "fully rebut[]" that inference.
that
finding
court's
district
on
the
weight
great
placed
Circuit
Eleventh
the defendants' prices increased at a lesser rate during the period of the
alleged conspiracy than prices had risen during the five-year period
before the alleged conspiracy commenced. 204 The Eleventh Circuit
interpreted this to mean that if a price-fixing conspiracy existed, it
205
necessarily failed to achieve its goal of accelerating price increases.
The Eleventh Circuit held that even if it had accepted one or more plus
factors presented by the plaintiffs, the failure of the alleged conspiracy
to raise prices higher than prevailing pre-Marlboro Friday prices and
to stabilize market shares meant that "the manufacturers would have
readily rebutted the resulting inference of collusion." 206 Ultimately, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendants' evidence of the alleged
cartel's failure would invalidate any circumstantial evidence of an
207
actual agreement to fix prices.
The Williamson opinion exhibits the hallmarks of hindsight
bias. The court examined whether the alleged agreement actually
succeeded in order to determine whether the alleged agreement ever
took place. The court did not appreciate that actual agreements (pricefixing and otherwise) often fail to achieve their goals. Such failure does
not mean that the agreement never occurred. Applying this insight to

201. Id. at 1305-19.
202. The court erred in rejecting many of these plus factors. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie,
Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 67 DUKE L.J. 557, 596-609 (2017) (explaining how the
Williamson court mishandled the plus factor of Defendants' price-fixing activities in other
countries).
203. Williamson, 346 F.3d at 1320.
204. Id.
205. The court also noted that the tobacco companies continued to spend considerable money
on retail promotions and that the relative market shares of tobacco companies had shifted during
the 1993 to 2000 period, events that would not happen in the shadow of a successful price-fixing
conspiracy. Id. at 1320-21.
206. Id. at 1321.
207. Id. at 1323.
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Williamson, the tobacco companies either agreed to raise price or they
did not. The fact that following Marlboro Friday the tobacco companies
engaged in twelve lockstep price increases, together with two handfuls
of plus factors, is powerful evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy. The
argument that Philip Morris did not maximize its profits does not
disprove the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy. A price war's failure
to stabilize a cartel (or to increase the aggressor's profits) does not mean
that the price war never happened or was not part of a cartel's
enforcement scheme. 208 It could simply mean that the cartel
enforcement mechanism failed, which is common. 209 The conspiracy
existed; it simply fell short. 210
In addition to exhibiting hindsight bias when deciding whether
defendants entered into a price-fixing conspiracy, judges may also fall
victim to hindsight bias when determining the duration of such

208. See Margaret C. Levenstein, Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the PreWorld War IBromine Industry, 45 J. INDUS. ECON. 117, 135 (1997).
209. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 558
(2004).
210. In a state follow-on case to the federal Williamson class action, the New Mexico Supreme
Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning that because "wholesale prices
remained lower than pre-Marlboro Friday levels and did not exceed pre-Marlboro Friday levels
until almost five years later, . . . [the] Defendants had no rational economic motive to conspire."
Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 242 P.3d 280, 299 (N.M. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This is hindsight bias: looking at price levels post-conspiracy does not dictate whether the
defendants had an incentive to conspire in the first place.
In perhaps the greatest irony of all, another one of the state courts in a companion case that
followed in the wake of Williamson claimed to recognize the problem of hindsight bias, but then
chastened the plaintiff for committing it. In Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 678 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals of Kansas followed the reasoning and holding of Williamson
to grant summary judgment to the tobacco-company defendants. In its plus-factor analysis, the
state court considered hindsight bias in an offhand way. Id. at 672. Generally, when plaintiffs try
to prove an agreement through circumstantial evidence, courts consider it a plus factor when firms
take similar actions that would be against their individual interests if taken independently. The
Kansas court quoted Williamson for the proposition that "courts necessarily 'must exercise
prudence in labeling a given action as being contrary to the actor's economic interests, lest we be
too quick to second-guess well-intentioned business judgments of all kinds.'" Id. at 666 (quoting
Williamson, 346 F.3d at 1310). The state court concluded that "to establish this plus factor, it is
not enough for a plaintiff to show that a particular action did not, in hindsight, ultimately work to
a defendant's financial advantage. Nor is it enough to say something other than self-interest might
have motivated the pricing decision." Id. at 672. Under the approach advanced by the Williamson
and Smith courts, a cartel's failure to succeed is proof positive that the cartel never existed, butconversely-whether a firm has acted against its individual self-interest should not be evaluated
in hindsight. The only consistency in this approach to hindsight issues is that the defendant always
wins. More importantly, this approach uses the hindsight warning to effectively dismantle the
action-against-individual-interest plus factor, which is particularly egregious because many courts
consider this the most important plus factor. See, e.g., In re Pool Prods. Distrib. Market Antitrust
Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. La. 2013) ("A plausible allegation that the parallel conduct
was not in the alleged conspirators' independent self-interest absent an agreement is generally
considered the most important 'plus factor.' ").
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conspiracies. For example, in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries
Co., the government prosecuted a manufacturer of thermal fax paper
211 The court
for participating in a price-fixing conspiracy with its rivals.
acknowledged that such a conspiracy "does not have to be successful to
be illegal." 2 12 Because, however, the alleged conspiracy failed to raise

prices, 213 the court came close to committing the form of hindsight bias
observed in our previous cases. 2 14 For example, the court noted that
although failure to raise price does not absolve price-fixing conspirators
from antitrust liability, 2 1 5 the failure to successfully implement the

price-fixing accord "plainly ... suggests that there was no such
agreement." 216 The court, however, could not equate failure with nonexistence because the government had significant evidence of an actual
agreement to fix prices, including a document from one of the
conspirators that memorialized a meeting among the competitors at
which an "agreement and approval was obtained from each company to
revise prices" that were then specified. 217 Testimonial evidence showed
efforts to implement these price increases. 2 18 Ultimately, much
evidence showed that the competitors certainly believed that they had
an agreement to fix prices, including internal reportS 2 19 and insider
testimony reciting conversations in which alleged conspirators stated
that "the manufacturers 'fixed the price by territory.' "220
The court nevertheless afforded great weight to the defendant's
evidence that "prices actually tended to fall when they were supposed
to be rising or at least stabilizing." 2 2 1 The court seemed to think that
falling prices meant that the conspiracy had been abandoned or had
never taken root. 2 2 2 After conceding that sufficient evidence suggested
that a conspiracy had begun in late March 1990, the court reasoned that
the conspiracy, if one existed, must have been abandoned that summer

211. 62 F. Supp. 2d 173, 181 (D. Mass. 1999).
212. Id.
213. However, because the conspiracy provided for flexibility in pricing-as opposed to setting
a fixed price for all customers, id. at 187-it is hardly surprising that the conspirators could be
attempting to collectively stabilize price yet fail to do so in the short term, even when operating
pursuant to a long-term agreement to raise market prices.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra notes 181-210 and accompanying text.
Nippon, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 187-88.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 185 n.22.
Id. (treating falling prices "as evidence of competition in what was a buyers' market").
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because prices were decreasing. 223 The court further held that even if
the failure to raise price did not prove an absence of conspiracy
immediately after the March 30 meeting, the failure to raise price was
"compelling" evidence that no conspiracy existed "by the fall of 1990."224
The court drew a critical distinction between the creation of the
conspiracy and the continuation of that conspiracy. The court
essentially held that the lack of a price increase did not preclude finding
that a conspiracy was formed in March of 1990, but it did prove that no
conspiracy existed in the fall of that same year. 225 Coupled with the lack
of direct evidence of actual price-fixing meetings in the fall of 1990, the
court held that the March 1990 agreement to fix prices must have been
abandoned because prices had not risen.226
This is essentially a variant of hindsight bias. In Matsushitaand
its progeny, courts treated a failure to succeed as proof of non-existence
from the very beginning. In Nippon, the court treated the failure to
succeed as proof of discontinuance soon after the conspiracy had been
formed. The court gave in to hindsight bias because it equated failure
in autumn as non-existence by that season. The Nippon court failed to
appreciate that failure to raise or sustain price is common in ongoing
price-fixing conspiracies because cheating is often endemic in active
cartels. Cartels often have to regroup and renegotiate when the agreedupon price fails to take hold in the market. 227 Falling prices may spur
cartel ringleaders to detect cheating and punish cheaters through a
wide array of mechanisms traditionally employed by cartel enforcers,
including fines, buybacks, and price wars designed to discipline those
who fail to charge the cartel price. 228 Under the Nippon court's
approach, cartel failure can lead to price fixers evading liability, as
happened in Nippon.229
The above opinions are misguided because the failure of a pricefixing conspiracy to raise price does not prove the absence of an

223. Id. at 186.
224. Id. at 189.
225. Id. at 192 ("[W]hatever agreement had existed in March, had dissolved by
mid 1990.... [T]he conspiracy was generally abandoned, before the limitations period.").
226. Id. at 191.
227. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 813, 833-34 (2011).
228. See Leslie, supra note 209, at 561-62. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Balancing the
Conspiracy'sBooks: Inter-CompetitorSales and Price-FixingCartels, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2018).
229. In Nippon, the statute of limitations played a critical role. 62 F. Supp. 2d at 196. The
plaintiffs filed their complaint in a timely manner only if the conspiracy were still ongoing in the
fall of 1990. Id. The court held that the conspiracy existed in March of 1990 but not in the fall
because it failed to raise prices at that time. Id.
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agreement. First, the conspirators may have succumbed to
overconfidence. Overconfidence can lead businesses to undertake
ventures that in hindsight seem ill conceived. 230 In the context of
antitrust conspiracies, price fixers seem burdened by an overconfidence
that leads them to believe that they can avoid detection. 231 The fact that
anticompetitive collusion fails to achieve its goals in no way proves that
the conspiracy never existed. 232 Second, cheating may prevent an
antitrust conspiracy from achieving its anticompetitive ends. Although
price fixing should increase each cartel member's long-term profits,
each firm can maximize its short-term profits by cheating on the cartel
by charging less than the cartel price and selling more than its cartel
allotment. 233 Cheating is relatively common among cartel
participants. 2 3 4 Although cheating may prevent the price-fixing
235
conspiracy from being effective, it does not negate antitrust liability.
Finally, an antitrust conspiracy may have goals beyond simply
increasing short-term price. 236
These hindsight-burdened opinions improperly conflate the two
distinct Section One issues of agreement and anticompetitive effects by
assuming that a lack of anticompetitive effects necessarily proves the
absence of an agreement. But these are separate elements and, indeed,
the first element of agreement should be determined before considering
230. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal
Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 505 (2002); id. at 503 ("[T]he psychological literature reveals a
number of cognitive processes that lead entrants, like other individuals making judgments with
significant personal stakes under uncertainty, to be overconfident about the prospects of their
ventures and insensitive to background statistical information.").
231. TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1930-2004, at 296 (2006) ("Though

blatant criminal behavior clearly motivated certain defendants, many malefactors possessed a
remarkable capacity for self-delusion whereby they convinced themselves that their actions were
either somehow not actually illegal or conversely, that they were too smart to be caught."); Gilbert
Geis, White Collar Crime: The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Case in 1961, in CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 143 (Marshall B. Clinard & Richard Quinney eds., 1967) ("Like
most reasonably adept and optimistic criminals, the antitrust violators had hoped to escape
apprehension. 'I didn't expect to get caught'. . . one of them said.").
232. See Leslie, supra note 64, at 308 ("The fact that a firm allegedly pursuing an
anticompetitive strategy ultimately fails does not mean that the strategy was unattempted. It
could simply mean that the firm was overoptimistic about its prospects for success. . .. "); id. at
307 ("In the context of anticompetitive conspiracies, overconfidence can explain why an arguably
irrational scheme is perceived as rational and consequently undertaken.").
233. Leslie, supra note 209, at 526.
234. Id. at 558-59.
235. In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 994 (N.D. Ohio 2015)
("Finally, while the competition evidence may suggest cheating on the agreement, that fact would
be relevant to the extent of antitrust injury (if any). The Sherman Act proscribes effective as well
as ineffective price-fixing conspiracies." (citing U.S. v. Hayter Oil Co. of Greeneville, 51 F.3d 1265,
1273-74 (6th Cir. 1995))).
236. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, ParallelExclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013).
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whether the agreement caused anticompetitive effects. 2 37 Judge Posner
has warned courts against falling into the "trap [of] failing to
distinguish between the existence of a conspiracy and its efficacy."238
This is particularly important, for example, when the agreement is per
se illegal, regardless of whether the conspirators actually abided by
their promises to fix prices. 239 Indeed, Judge Posner noted that "pricefixing agreements are illegal even if the parties were completely
unrealistic in supposing they could influence the market price." 2 4 0 The
law is clear, but judicial applications often fail the law.241
D. Hindsight Bias as Pro-Defendantin Antitrust Jurisprudence
The examples of hindsight bias discussed thus far favor
antitrust defendants, but antitrust plaintiffs could theoretically benefit
from hindsight bias as well. For example, a series of uniform lock-step
price increases by competitors could, in retrospect, be treated as proof
that the firms must have conspired to raise price. But courts explicitly
prohibit drawing such an inference from parallel price hikes alone. 2 4 2
Thus, even if it appears that a failure to raise and maintain higher.
prices "proves" that no conspiracy existed, the opposite does not hold
true according to the courts. Hindsight bias, in the context of conspiracy
claims, benefits only antitrust defendants.
The story is more complicated with attempted monopolization
claims. In those cases, plaintiffs will sometimes plead that a defendant's

237. In the context of per se illegal agreements, anticompetitive effects are presumed as a
matter of law. See Big Bear Lodging Ass'n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir.
1999) ("Elaborate market analysis and case-by-case evaluation are unnecessary in cases involving
per se antitrust violations because the anticompetitive effects of the practice are presumed.").
238. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2002).
239. Id. ("An agreement to fix list prices is ... a per se violation of the Sherman Act even if
most or for that matter all transactions occur at lower prices.").
240. Id. at 655.
241. In addition to the cases discussed earlier in this Section, see Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v.
Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting)
("The Court argues that prices eventually went down ... but this glosses over the fact that they
first rose dramatically, then remained above both the forecasted price . . . ."); and Lifschultz Fast
Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1277, 1286 (D.S.C. 1992), affd, 998
F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1993).
242. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015)
("[E]vidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy.");
Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 51 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[P]arallel pricing ... cannot, by itself, support an inference that the two companies conspired to
fix prices."); see also Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 859 (10th Cir. 1999) ("While
consciously parallel behavior may contribute to a finding of antitrust conspiracy, it is insufficient,
standing alone, to prove conspiracy.").
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post-conduct increase in market share demonstrates that the defendant
had a dangerous probability of monopolizing the market. 2 4 3 Courts,

&

such as the Fourth Circuit's opinion in M & M Medical Supplies
Service, Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc., have reasoned that "[a]
rising share may show more probability of success than a falling
share." 2 4 4 This may seem like hindsight bias of the sort described in
Section II.A, but it is not.
First, raising and falling market share are distinguishable, such
that one may reasonably extrapolate from a defendant successfully
raising its market share that the defendant possessed a dangerous
probability of successfully monopolizing. Some courts claim that a
defendant's failure to increase its market share demonstrates a lack of
capacity to monopolize the market. 245 Similarly, many courts hold that
a reduction in the defendant's market share proves that the defendant
246
Actual
lacked the "capacity to monopolize" the relevant market.
began
defendant
increases in the defendant's market share after the
engaging in anticompetitive conduct, however, help demonstrate
capacity and thus prevent courts from incorrectly concluding that it was
not possible for the defendant to increase its market share through the
challenged anticompetitive conduct. Thus, success shows capability; in
contrast, failure does not prove incapability, let alone the probability or
inevitability of failure.
Further, depending on the size of the defendant's initial market
share, the plaintiff may find it necessary to discuss a defendant's
increase in market share over time to prove a necessary element of an
attempted monopolization claim. Some courts have held that "[t]he
[market] share that is relevant for determining whether the defendant
243. See, e.g., United Energy Trading, LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1022
(N.D. Cal. 2016) ("[S]ince the schemes took effect, PG&E's share of the natural gas load has
increased from eighty-one (81) to eight-four (84) percent.").
244. 981 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
245. See supra note 91.
246. Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982); see
also Tarrant Serv. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 12 F.3d 609, 615-16 (6th Cir. 1993)
("Furthermore, Tarrant has not produced any other evidence that Trane was capable of, much less
achieved, a dangerous probability of success in destroying competition in the relevant product
market or controlling prices."); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413,
1431 (6th Cir. 1990) ("There is no substantial evidence that defendants were capable of, much less
achieved, the destruction of competition in limestone in any relevant market."); Colo. Interstate
Gas Co. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 694-95 (10th Cir. 1989) ("In evaluating the
probability of successful monopolization 'we must consider the firm's capacity to commit the
offense, the scope of its objective, and the character of its conduct.'" (quoting Kearney & Trecker
Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 (7th Cir. 1971))); Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at
271 ("In an antitrust context we must consider the firm's capacity to commit the offense, the scope
of its objective, and the character of its conduct." (quoting Kearney, 452 F.2d at 598)).
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can satisfy the 'dangerous probability of success' requirement of
attempted monopolization should be either that which he possesses at
the time of litigation or the largest share he possessed during the period
of the alleged offense." 247 This makes sense; if the defendant begins
engaging in anticompetitive conduct when it is a relatively small player,
it may not have a sufficiently high market share to constitute a
dangerous probability of monopolizing the market. But when the
defendant's market share subsequently increases to the point of
crossing the necessary threshold, the conduct may then constitute a
Section Two violation. Once it has a sufficiently high market share, the
firm should not be immunized from antitrust liability because it had a
low market share when it began its campaign of anticompetitive
conduct.
Finally, the defendant's increase in market share may be
relevant to show that the defendant did not merely attempt to
monopolize the market, but actually succeeded in doing so. This may be
necessary because it is common for antitrust plaintiffs to plead both
actual monopolization and attempted monopolization. For these
reasons, evidence of increasing market share does not pose the same
risk of hindsight bias as does evidence of decreasing market share. This
risk differential makes hindsight bias a decidedly pro-defendant
cognitive bias in the context of attempted monopolization claims.
Similarly, in predatory pricing cases, courts may appear to
engage in hindsight bias when holding that evidence of actual
recoupment makes summary judgment inappropriate. 2 4 8 For example,
the Brooke Group Court implied that actual recoupment is one method
of showing that the predator enjoyed a dangerous probability of
recoupment when it priced below cost. 2 4 9 Some scholars have argued
247. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Profl Publ'ns, Inc.,
63 F.3d 1540, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶f 711.2d, 835.2b. (Supp. 1994)).
248. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 931 (6th Cir. 2005) ("A corollary
of this principle of Brooke Group, is that where the market is highly concentrated, the barriers to
entry are high, the defendant has market power and excess capacity, and evidence of actual
recoupment is present, summary judgment is inappropriate." (emphasis added)).
249. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 232-33 (1993):
Based on Liggett's theory of the case and the record it created, there are two means by
which one might infer that Brown & Williamson had a reasonable prospect of producing
sustained supracompetitive pricing in the generic segment adequate to recoup its
predatory losses: first, if generic output or price information indicates that oligopolistic
price coordination in fact produced supracompetitive prices in the generic segment; or
second, if evidence about the market and Brown & Williamson's conduct indicate that
the alleged scheme was likely to have brought about tacit coordination and oligopoly
pricing in the generic segment, even if it did not actually do so.;
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that actual recoupment satisfies the dangerous probability of success
element. 250
Post-predation evidence of actual recoupment, however, does not
create the same risk of hindsight bias as post-predation evidence of a
lack of recoupment. First, evidence of actual recoupment has more
probative value than evidence of nonrecoupment. If recoupment
actually occurred, then it makes sense to say that there was a
reasonable probability of it occurring. Conversely, if recoupment did not
occur, that does not necessarily prove that there was never a reasonable
probability of recoupment occurring.251
Second, even when recoupment does occur, far from exhibiting
hindsight bias, courts still sometimes find that the defendant lacked a
reasonable probability of recoupment. Most notably, in Brooke Group,
the Supreme Court held that the defendant did not have a reasonable
probability of recoupment despite the evidence that recoupment had
occurred. 2 52 The Supreme Court did not engage in hindsight bias by
noting that actual recoupment occurred and then reasoning backwards
that the defendant must have necessarily possessed a reasonable
probability of recoupment. Instead, the majority discounted postpredation evidence inconsistent with its conclusion that recoupment
was never probable. This suggests that, as with attempted
monopolization claims, evidence of post-conduct success does not seem
to pose the same risk of hindsight bias as does evidence of post-conduct
failure.
Beyond the pro-defendant hindsight bias documented in cases
involving attempted monopolization, predatory pricing, and price-fixing
conspiracies, there are some areas of antitrust law where hindsight bias
should, in theory, favor the plaintiff. For example, a monopolist's
pursuit of anticompetitive litigation can constitute illegal monopoly
conduct if the monopolist brings a "sham" lawsuit against a

see also David F. Shores, Law, Facts and Market Realities in Antitrust Cases After Brooke and
Kodak, 48 SMU L. REV. 1835, 1847 (1995) ("A reasonable prospect for recoupment could have been
established, the [Brooke Group] Court noted, either by evidence of actual recoupment or by a
showing that recoupment was probable.").
250. Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2270 (2000) ("With such evidence of actual recoupment
already in progress, it seems reasonable to infer a coherent predatory strategy without requiring
the plaintiff to completely spell out and prove the logic of the strategy.").
251. Suppose someone were to argue that recoupment is impossible. Showing an instance in
which recoupment did not occur does not prove that recoupment is impossible; it merely shows
that recoupment did not occur. If, however, there was an instance in which recoupment did
actually occur, that would, in fact, disprove the statement.
252. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 243; see also Leslie, supra note 156, at 1737.
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competitor. 253 To prove sham litigation, an antitrust plaintiff must
prove that the anticompetitive litigation was objectively baseless and
"the baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor through the use of governmental
process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an
anticompetitive weapon." 2 5 4 The first element is objective, the second
subjective.
When the monopolist's litigation ultimately fails to succeed, it
could appear in hindsight that the litigation must have been objectively
baseless, thus satisfying the first element. Yet courts consistently
assert that the merits of the monopolist's prior-concluded lawsuits
against its rivals should not be judged in hindsight when the monopolist
loses. 2 5 5 Conversely, courts do hold that when the monopolist's prior
anticompetitive litigation had some success, the litigation must not
have been objectively baseless. 256 This is not necessarily true because
"even a successful infringement lawsuit could conceivably provide the
basis for an anticompetitive litigation claim if the patentee prevailed in
its prior infringement suit only because it successfully concealed itst

253. See, e.g., Profl Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Indus. (PREI), 508 U.S. 49,
56 (1993) ("Noerr, however, withheld immunity from 'sham' activities because 'application of the
Sherman Act would be justified' when petitioning activity, 'ostensibly directed toward influencing
governmental action, is a mere sham to cover . .. an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor.'" (quoting R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961))).
254. Id. at 60-61.
255. See, e.g., Balt. Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 237 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 2001)
("Lawsuits are not objectively baseless simply because a litigant lost."); Fitbit, Inc. v. Aliphcom,
No. 5:15-cv-04073-EJD, 2016 WL 7888033, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) ("And even if
Defendant prevails on the question of infringement, a court may still rule that the suit was not
objectively baseless because Plaintiff may well have filed the suit with a realistic expectation
of prevailing on the merits."); Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d
1061, 1069 (W.D. Ark. 2010) ("Even if Mitsubishi prevails in the infringement actions, if they are
close, hard-fought cases, that fact could result in a finding, as a matter of law, that those actions
were not objectively baseless, which would resolve this action."); AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Labs.,
Inc., Nos. 00 Civ. 6749, 03 Civ. 6057, 2010 WL 2079722, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010) ('While
surviving summary judgment may not establish conclusively that a suit is not a sham, it provides
strong evidence that Astra could have reasonably expected success on the merits." (citing Sulzer
Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE & MICHAEL A. CARRIER, IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

§

11.03[B][2] (3d ed. 2016) ("Even unsuccessful suits are nonetheless normally entitled to
immunity under the objective prong of PREL").
256. PREI, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5 ("A winning lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at
petitioning for redress and therefore not a sham."); Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., 248 F. Supp.
3d 1040, 1055 (D. Colo. 2017) ("Crocs states that its patent lawsuits cannot be considered
objectively baseless because Crocs has prevailed against Dawgs in the Federal Circuit and the ITC.
The Court agrees.").
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fraud against the PTO, which has since been exposed." 257 Ultimately,
the hindsight effects are decidedly pro-defendant.
III. How HINDSIGHT BIAS REWRITES AND UNDERMINES ANTITRUST
DOCTRINE
When present, hindsight bias may do more than simply affect
the results in individual cases. Hindsight bias may fundamentally
distort antitrust doctrine in a manner that substantively weakens
antitrust common law. This change in doctrine is neither explained nor
explicit in judicial opinions. It occurs sub rosa without any justification
for why antitrust doctrine should change. This Part examines how the
hindsight bias discussed in Part II effectively undermines some
fundamental aspects of antitrust law.
A. Hindsight Bias Immunizes FailedAttempts to Monopolize
When judges succumb to hindsight bias, they can alter
substantive antitrust doctrine. Section Two of the Sherman Act
condemns both a defendant's illegal acquisition and attempted
acquisition of monopoly power, which the Supreme Court has long held
is the power to raise prices, not necessarily the actual exercise of such
power. 258 In the context of attempt claims, courts recognize that "the
Sherman Act's prohibition against attempted monopolization does not
require that the attempt in fact ripen into an actual monopoly. It is the
attempt which is the offense." 259 Successful monopolization is not part
of an attempted monopolization claim; successful monopolization is a
separate antitrust cause of action with its own elements.
Hindsight bias changes this dynamic. If courts accept
defendants' invitations to review probabilities in hindsight, then the
"failure of the alleged monopoly scheme proves there was never any
'dangerous probability' of its success. Such a conclusion would
undermine

most

attempt

claims." 2 6 0

Examining

the

would-be

monopolist's success or failure in retrospect comes close to eliminating
257. HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 255, § 11.03[B][2] (citing Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp.,
70 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 1995)).
258. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) ("The authorities support
the view that the material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is not that
prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power exists to raise prices or
to exclude competition when it is desired to do so.").
259. Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at 270-71 (citing Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis,
Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971)).
260. White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 869, 893 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
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attempted monopolization as an antitrust claim altogether. As the
Seventh Circuit correctly observed: "A subsequent failure to achieve
monopoly status cannot itself vitiate a claim of attempted monopoly
where other evidence substantially supports the attempt without
eviscerating the entire attempt offense." 26 1 After all, if an antitrust
plaintiff must show that a defendant's attempt to monopolize a market
succeeded, that is tantamount to requiring actual monopolization,
which is its own separate cause of action under Section Two. In effect,
hindsight bias surreptitiously reads the attempted monopolization
language out of the Sherman Act altogether. 262
Courts make a grave mistake when allowing a firm to escape
antitrust liability because the firm's anticompetitive conduct proved
ineffective. Although private plaintiffs must show that they have
suffered antitrust injury in order to prevail on an attempted
monopolization claim, the defendant's anticompetitive conduct can
inflict antitrust injury even when it fails to achieve actual
monopolization. Some courts have reasoned that a defendant cannot be
liable for attempted monopolization if the plaintiff was profitable
despite the defendant's anticompetitive conduct. 263 Such holdings are
inconsistent with the principle that "an antitrust plaintiffs postviolation successes do not necessarily preclude compensation for
damages proximately caused by an antitrust violation." 264 An antitrust
plaintiff can succeed in business, yet still suffer antitrust injury if the
plaintiff makes less profit than it would have but for the defendant's
anticompetitive conduct. Even a failed attempt to monopolize can injure
a competitive economy by "impos[ing] enormous losses on rivals who
must spend resources defending themselves or make costly exits from
the market in favor of other firms." 2 6 5 For example, if the attempted
monopolization claim is based on the defendant bringing sham
litigation, then the litigation costs incurred in defending against the
anticompetitive lawsuits constitute antitrust damages that are

261. Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d at 270-71. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit went on to say
that circuit law did "not forbid consideration of subsequent market performance to evaluate the
existence of the alleged attempt ..... Id. The court was seemingly unaware how considering such
subsequent market performance invites hindsight bias.
262. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Profl Publ'ns,
Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Because we are talking about probabilities, it is not
necessary for a defendant to already possess monopoly power in the target market; indeed, if it
did, the offense would be monopolization, not attempt.").
263. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
264. Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestl6, S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 122 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Pierce v.
Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 436 (5th Cir. 1985)).
265. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36 (1989).
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recoverable. 266 Antitrust law condemns attempted monopolization in
order to deter costly anticompetitive conduct. 2 67 Yet when hindsight
bias protects would-be (though ultimately unsuccessful) monopolists,
this deterrence is weakened. Furthermore, if the law did not punish
attempts to monopolize, it would instead reward ineffectual wrongdoers
for their incompetence, even when their actions cause the type of harm
that the Sherman Act seeks to prevent. 26 8
Moreover, using evidence of the defendant's post-conduct failure
to monopolize as proof that actual monopolization was improbable or
impossible is incorrect. A defendant's market share can decrease even
though it has a dangerous probability of monopolizing the market.269 A
failure to monopolize may be due to changed circumstances that were
unanticipated at the time of the anticompetitive conduct. For example,
in the case of commodities found in nature, such as minerals, the
discovery of a new deposit can upend a market. In technology markets,
the development of new systems and equipment can topple a monopolist
or can supplant a market altogether, as when DVD technology
displaced VHS tapes and recorders. When displacement occurs, a
former monopolist can transition from dominance to insolvency. Most
importantly, the antitrust litigation itself might have thwarted the
defendant's attempt to monopolize the market since firms may reduce
their anticompetitive conduct and their market share when they are
defending against antitrust claims. Thus, it is particularly
inappropriate for courts to use the defendant's market share during the
sometimes years into the antitrust
antitrust litigation-and
litigation-to hold that the defendant could not have had a dangerous
probability of monopolizing the market years earlier when the
266. Handgards v. Ethicon, 601 F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 1979) ("In a suit alleging antitrust
injury based upon a bad faith prosecution theory it is obvious that the costs incurred in defense of
the prior patent infringement suit are an injury which 'flows' from the antitrust wrong."); see
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 255, § 6.2b3 (collecting cases).
267. See Hovenkamp, supra note 265, at 37 ("[Recognizing a cause of action for failed attempts
[to monopolize] increases the cost of making them."); see also Jessica L. Goldstein, Single Firm
Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law: The Rose Acre Recoupment Test and the Search for an
Appropriate Judicial Standard, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1779 (1991) ("The antitrust laws,
especially the 'attempt to monopolize' offense, are meant not only to protect consumers but also to
deter conduct whose motivating forces are anticompetitive.").
268. See Roszkowski & Brubaker, supra note 66, at 381 ("A third major function of attempt
law is equality of treatment. If an actor attempts to commit a crime and fails due to a fortuity, it
is inequitable to exculpate that person on this ground alone." (citing MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5
introduction, at 294 (1985))); see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2(b), at 499-500
(2d ed. 1986).
269. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 758 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1985) ("We would like to
specifically point out, however, that a decline in a company's market share does not mandate the
conclusion that the company lacks the capacity to monopolize.") (collecting cases).

2018]

HINDSIGHT BIAS INANTITRUST LAW

1577

defendant began its anticompetitive conduct. Yet courts fail to recognize
that filing an antitrust claim may be connected with a defendant's
failure to monopolize a market. In sum, a defendant's failure to achieve
actual monopoly through exclusionary conduct does not mean that
there was not a dangerous probability of success at the time that the
exclusionary conduct took place.
B. Hindsight Bias Imposes an Actual Recoupment Requirement for
Predator'sLosses
Predatory pricing law requires only that the predator have a
dangerous probability of recouping its losses, not that it actually
succeeds in doing so. 2 7 0 However, when courts suggest that factfinders
should interpret an absence of actual recoupment as proof that a
dangerous probability of recoupment never existed, they effectively
amend antitrust law to require actual recoupment without
acknowledging that they are changing antitrust doctrine. 271
Because predatory pricing inflicts significant injury even
without recoupment, such a change in substantive antitrust law is
unwarranted. 272 Recoupment only occurs if the defendant raises its
price both high enough and long enough to compensate for the losses
sustained in the predation period. But the consumers paying monopoly
prices in the post-predation period suffer antitrust injury, regardless of
whether the monopoly profits are sufficient to recoup the defendant's
investment in predatory pricing. 273 Professors Phillip Areeda and
Herbert Hovenkamp have explained that "post-predation prices can be
significantly supracompetitive, thereby injuring consumers, and yet be
insufficient in size or duration to provide full recoupment for the
270. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251 (U.S. 1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that neither the Robinson-Patman Act nor the Sherman Act
"requires proof that a predatory plan has actually succeeded in accomplishing its objective").
271. Scholars have considered whether predatory pricing claims should be dismissed in
"factual situations where predation was unsuccessful." C. Scott Hemphill, The Role of Recoupment
in PredatoryPricingAnalyses, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1607 (2001). Support for this proposition is
found in the language of judicial opinions, like those that treat "'unsuccessful predation' " as "'a
boon to consumers.'" Id. (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224); see also Advo, Inc. v. Phila.
Newspapers, 51 F.3d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Predatory pricing schemes that fail at the
recoupment stage may injure specific competitors . . . , but do not injure competition (i.e. they do
not injure consumers) and so produce no antitrust injury . . .. Such futile below-cost pricing
effectively bestows a gift on consumers, and the Sherman Act does not condemn such inadvertent
charity."); W. Parcel Express v. UPS of Am., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("Predatory
pricing is only harmful when the predator succeeds in recouping the losses it suffered by its earlier
below-cost pricing."), aff'd, 190 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
272. Leslie, supra note 156, at 1741-44.
273. Id. at 1742.
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defendant's investment in predation." 274 Beyond the costs incurred by
consumers, failed predatory pricing also disrupts the economy by
causing inefficient overconsumption during the predation period and
inefficient underconsumption during the post-predation period. 275 The
Supreme Court in Brooke Group acknowledged that "unsuccessful
predatory pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution toward
the product being sold at less than its cost." 2 7 6 These market disruptions
shift resources away from their most efficient uses. 2 7 7

Predatory pricing schemes that fail at the recoupment stage
nonetheless hurt efficient competitors who are driven from the market.
For example, in the American Airlines predatory pricing case discussed
in Part II.B, the court fell victim to hindsight bias by granting summary
judgment to the defendant because no actual recoupment occurred, all
while noting that the excluded competitors had lower costs. 2 7 8 Even
when the predator's rivals do not exit the market permanently, they
pay unnecessary costs to compete against the predator's inefficiently
low price. 279
Furthermore, a predatory pricing scheme may not lead to actual
recoupment even though the predator possessed a dangerous
probability of recoupment when it began engaging in below-cost pricing.
The scheme may have failed due to unforeseen circumstances, such as
the unexpected discovery of new sources of a commodity. 2 80 More
importantly, recoupment may not occur because of the antitrust
litigation challenging the defendant's predatory pricing. 28 1 Predators
with patience and foresight may game the system by lying in wait
because "if actual recoupment were required, a predator might be able
to avoid liability by delaying recoupment until risk of suit has

274.

3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

¶

726, at 77 (3d ed.

2008). Additionally, that consumers in the predation period paid a low price does not negate the
injury borne by consumers who paid a monopoly price in the post-predation period. See Leslie,
supra note 156, at 1742.
275. Leslie, supra note 156, at 1743.
276. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).
277. Leslie, supra note 156, at 1743.
278. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2003).
279. Hovenkamp, supra note 265, at 36 (noting that even when a predatory pricing scheme
fails, "the attempt itself can impose enormous losses on rivals who must spend resources defending
themselves or make costly exits from the market in favor of other firms").
280. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 160, at 407 n.390 (hypothesizing a predatory pricing
scenario in the diamond market in which "all experts agreed th[at] recoupment was certain to
succeed-but that just before trial a mother lode of diamonds was discovered and diamond prices
plummeted, to remain depressed for the foreseeable future").
281. See id.
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passed." 2 82 As a result, a de facto actual recoupment requirement would

fundamentally change the nature of the offense and would create false
negatives. 283 Whatever the circumstances, judges clouded by hindsight
can exonerate price predators that actually charged a price below cost,
injured their efficient rivals, and had a dangerous probability of
recoupment. 284
C. Hindsight Bias Adds an Efficacy Requirement to Per Se Section One
Violations
Hindsight bias can also fundamentally distort antitrust law
related to conspiracies. Per se violations of Section One of the Sherman
Act do not have an efficacy requirement. For per se violations, plaintiffs
do not have to show any market effects; 285 anticompetitive effects are
presumed as a matter of law. Consequently, defendants cannot argue
that their agreement does not violate Section One because it had no.
anticompetitive effects. 2 8 6 Antitrust law does not limit its condemnation
282. Bolton, supra note 250, at 2269-70.
283. Michael A. Salinger, The Legacy of Matsushita: The Role of Economics in Antitrust
Litigation, 38 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 475, 484 (2007):
Requiring actual recoupment would necessarily create some risk of false negatives, as
it is certainly possible for a company to have a reasonable expectation that predation
would be profitable only to have unexpected events make the company ultimately regret
its attempt. Still, if the costs of false positives are sufficiently great relative to the cost
of false negatives, then that risk might be worth taking.
284. The hindsight bias problem is magnified by the fact that courts often incorrectly conclude
that recoupment is unlikely-or did not happen-as a result of judges not understanding how
recoupment occurs. For example, courts often fail to appreciate how recoupment sometimes takes
place in markets other than the market in which the predation occurred. These include other
geographic markets and other products markets, including complementary product, substitute
product, and replacement product markets. Leslie, supra note 156 at 1720-32. Judges also fail to
understand that a price predator need not actually monopolize the market in order to recoup its
losses because recoupment can occur through cartel pricing or oligopoly pricing. Id. at 1734-38.
All of this counsels against imposing an actual recoupment requirement, yet courts essentially do
this when they allow hindsight bias to affect their determinations of ex ante probabilities.
285. United States v. Sargent Elec. Co., 785 F.2d 1123, 1127 (3d Cir. 1986) ('When the
concerted action is price-fixing or bid-rigging, the Sherman Act caselaw shortcuts the inquiry into
market effect, by treating such concerted actions as per se violations."). In contrast, plaintiffs
pursuing rule-of-reason claims need to show anticompetitive effects. See Lektro-Vend II, 660 F.2d
at 268 ("It is by now well established that any rule of reason analysis requires a showing of
anticompetitive market effect.").
286. For agreements challenged under the rule of reason, a plaintiff must prove
anticompetitive effects in order to show that the defendants' agreement violated Section One. It
would still constitute hindsight bias to conclude that an absence of anticompetitive effects means
that no agreement was made, but this would not necessarily change the ultimate result because
of the lack of anticompetitive effects.
Although the correct result is reached either way, the path differs. The method that commits
hindsight bias would say that the absence of anticompetitive effects must mean that no agreement
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to successful cartels; 287 any agreement to fix price is illegal, whether
successful or not. 28 8 The agreement alone is a violation, even without
any subsequent act to implement the agreement. 289
Hindsight bias can essentially amend Section One by imposing
an effectiveness requirement on price-fixing and other per se claims in
cases where the plaintiffs are proving an agreement through
circumstantial evidence. 290 When courts equate a lack of efficacy with
an absence of agreement, judges are effectively rewriting the Sherman
Act. If plaintiffs cannot prove an agreement absent proof of that
conspiracy's success, then the agreement alone is no longer illegal-at
least in cases where the claim is being proven with circumstantial
evidence. As such, hindsight bias risks undermining antitrust law's per
se rule against price fixing.
Price-fixing conspiracies can inflict injuries even when the
market price does not increase following the rivals' agreement. While
some price-fixing cartels are successful at increasing price, many are

existed in the first place and thus the first element of Section One liability is not met. The
reasoning here is flawed because the absence of effects does not prove an absence of agreement. In
contrast, the proper way of finding no liability would be to say that the absence of anticompetitive
effects means that the alleged agreement did not unreasonably restrain trade and thus the second
element of Section One liability is not met.
287. Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n of N. Cal. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1960)
("Nor does the fact that a plan entered into by competitors to control prices, and having an effect
thereon, did not ultimately succeed on accomplishing what the parties anticipated, absolve them
from their violation of the law.").
288. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940) ("It is the 'contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce' which § 1 of the Act strikes down,
whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the
other."); United States v. Hayter Oil Co. of Greeneville, 51 F.3d 1265, 1273 (6th Cir. 1995)
("[I]n Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Supreme Court made clear that showing effect or success is not
required to establish a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."); In re Chocolate Confectionary
Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 788 (VI.D. Pa. 2014) (noting that although a particular
conspiracy may "constitute[ ] 'a failed attempt to fix prices,' it is the attempt itself, not the ultimate
success or profitability of the price-fixing scheme, that the Sherman Act proscribes"); see also
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of a conspiracy. It is the joint plan to
restrain trade, however, and not its success, that is prohibited by § 1." (citing Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913))).
289. Hayter Oil, 51 F.3d at 1270 ("Proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Because the price-fixing agreement itself constitutes the crime, the
government is only required to prove that the agreement existed during the statute of limitations
period and that the defendant knowingly entered into that agreement." (citing Socony-Vacuum,
310 U.S. at 224 n. 59)); United States v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The heart of
a Section One violation is the agreement to restrain; no overt act, no actual implementation of the
agreement is necessary to constitute an offense.").
290. This analysis assumes no direct evidence of an agreement; this is not an unreasonable
assumption because direct evidence is often lacking, thus requiring plaintiffs to use circumstantial
evidence that a price-fixing agreement existed.

2018]

HINDSIGHT BIAS IN ANTITRUST LAW

1581

not. 2 9 1 In some cases, the conspirators do not intend to raise the price

but rather intend to stabilize the pre-conspiracy market price and
prevent it from falling. Such nonmovement of price may appear to
suggest an absence of agreement. But, if the conspirators' goal was to
maintain-not increase-price, then the conspiracy has succeeded. This
is so even if a federal judge considering a defendant's motion for
summary judgment deems the conspiracy a failure. The conspiracy's
success in preventing a drop in the market price injures consumers who
pay more than they would have but for the agreement to maintain price.
Judicial opinions affected by hindsight bias risk encouraging
more price-fixing conspiracies. If a cartel's failure to succeed in
sufficiently raising price were to constitute evidence that the
competitors never agreed in the first place, as the Eleventh Circuit
suggested in Williamson, this could incentivize more firms to engage in
price fixing. Firms are more likely to join a price-fixing cartel if they
conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs. If cartel failure provides
a quasi-defense to cartelization-because hindsight bias equates failure
with a lack of conspiracy-then price fixing is more likely to appear cost
effective to a firm considering engaging in it. An antitrust rule based on
hindsight bias operates as an insurance policy for price fixers: if the
conspiracy fails to raise price, then the conspirators are not liable under
Section One because courts will infer that no agreement existed. 292
Ironically, when conspirators cheat on their cartel agreement, as is
common, they may be immunizing their conspiracy from liability. 2 9 3

Antitrust law is not intended to "save defendants who have clearly,
though foolishly, conspired." 294 For price-fixing firms, the worst-case
scenario is for the cartel to fail to raise prices sufficiently and yet still
be discovered and held liable for their antitrust violation. Hindsight
bias takes this worst-case scenario off the table if a cartel's failure to
raise price is equated with a lack of agreement. In short, an antitrust

291. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Studies of Cartel Stability: A Comparison
of Methodological Approaches, in How CARTELS ENDURE AND How THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF
INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION 9, 14 (Peter Z. Grossman ed., 2004) ("Some cartels are very successful at
increasing prices and profits, while others are dramatic failures."). In some markets, the inflated
cartel price may encourage new entry into the market, which drives price back down. Id. at 30.
292. Under the Williamson approach, a lack of success rebuts this circumstantial evidence.
293. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1047-48
(8th Cir. 2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting) ("If, to prove collusion, a plaintiff has to prove that there
was no cheating, thus no downward pressure on prices, cartels will be quite safe from the Sherman
Act.").
294. Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 101 (2d ed. 2003)).
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regime that permits hindsight bias makes price-fixing conspiracies
more likely.
In sum, judges act inconsistently when they say that a
conspiracy need not be successful, but then hold that an alleged
conspiracy's failure serves as strong evidence that the conspiracy never
occurred. In the context of determining criminal penalties for price
fixers, the Sixth Circuit has observed that "[i]t would be an anomaly to
declare price-fixing illegal per se, without regard to its success, merely
because of its plainly anticompetitive effect, but to provide for a fine
only if the price-fixing were successful." 295 While Judge Posner
cautioned about the "trap [ofj failing to distinguish between the
existence of a conspiracy and its efficacy," 296 hindsight bias could
elevate this mistake from an aberration to a canon.
IV. HAVING THE FORESIGHT TO PREVENT HINDSIGHT BIAS IN
ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Given the existence of hindsight bias in antitrust litigation and
its power to surreptitiously undermine antitrust doctrine, courts should
take appropriate steps to prevent hindsight bias from infecting
antitrust litigation. The predicament, unfortunately, is easier stated
than solved. This Part explores the resilience of hindsight bias-in both
legal and nonlegal contexts-and explains that awareness of the
problem does not naturally lead to a solution.
A. Hindsight Bias and Antitrust Juries
If the factfinder learns about an alleged monopolist's failure to
monopolize, an alleged predator's failure to recoup, or an alleged

295. United States v. Hayter Oil Co. of Greeneville, 51 F.3d 1265, 1274 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Such
a rule would result in the government being relieved of the burden of ascertaining a conspiracy's
effect and success for purposes of obtaining a conviction only to have to bear that very burden to
establish the propriety of any fine."); see United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 195 F.3d 83,
92 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We agree [with Hayter Oil] that ineffectual price-fixers should not escape
meaningful penalty, particularly considering that the Guidelines scheme for price-fixing crimes
relies on general deterrence and fines rather than long jail sentences.").
Actual anticompetitive effects are not necessary for criminal convictions for price fixing, as the
Supreme Court has implied that "conduct undertaken with the purpose of producing
anticompetitive effects" can "support criminal liability, even if such effects did not come to pass."
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 n.21 (1978). Participants in unsuccessful
price-fixing conspiracies are still liable for criminal penalties and face minimum fines and
potential imprisonment. Anne Marie Herron, The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline:Deterring Crime
by Clarifying the Volume of Commerce Muddle, 51 EMoRY L.J. 929, 947-48 (2002).
296. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2002).
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conspiracy's failure to raise prices, that knowledge will necessarily
invite hindsight bias in a way that undermines antitrust doctrine. A
limiting instruction to juries might seem like the most obvious solution
to the hindsight bias problem. For example, judges could instruct juries
that defendants' eventual failure to monopolize or to recoup does not
mean that the defendants did not enjoy a dangerous probability of doing
so when they embarked on their course of anticompetitive conduct. 297
Similarly, judges could state explicitly that the failure to raise market
price does not prove the absence of an agreement to raise or stabilize
prices. The conventional wisdom is that juries disregard evidence when
instructed to do so by a judge. 298
Jury instructions, however, cannot eliminate hindsight bias.
Subjects in hindsight bias experiments do not ignore outcomes even
when told to do S0.299 Indeed, the very nature of hindsight bias may
prevent juries from ignoring evidence that they have been admonished
to disregard. 300 Jurors may be either unwilling or unable to ignore
information as demanded by a judge. 301 A mere jury instruction cannot
change the way that a juror's brain processes information. 302 Moreover,
limiting instructions can be counterproductive, as "research on
'psychological reactance' indicates that instructions to ignore

297. It is hard to believe that judges could sufficiently admonish juries not to overweigh this
evidence when judges themselves do so. See supra Part II.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhe subsequent
striking of erroneously admitted evidence accompanied by a clear and positive instruction to the
jury to disregard cures the error.").
299. Wexler & Schopp, supra note 51, at 487-88 ("[S]ubjects provided with outcome
information and asked to disregard it did not behave like subjects asked to predict a given outcome
in the absence of outcome knowledge."); id. at 488 ("Several studies have shown that merely
admonishing people to disregard outcome information does not eliminate the hindsight bias."
(citing Fischhoff, supra note 3)); see also Baruch Fischhoff, PerceivedInformativeness of Facts, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE 349 (1977).

&

300. Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 6, at 319. Hindsight bias can prevent jurors from ignoring
evidence that they have been instructed to ignore. See Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict,
Jo L. Perry, JurorDecision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 291,
309 (1989) ("The hindsight bias offers another paradigm. It suggests a somewhat different process,
one in which the information is integrated into interpretation and recall of testimony in a way that
makes it difficult for jurors to ignore information even when they conscientiously try to do so.").
301. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1260 ("First, people who face instructions to ignore
information might not want to ignore it and might attend to it even in the face of instructions to
disregard it (motivation). Second, ... people might find it difficult to avoid thinking about
information they want to ignore (ironic process theory).").
302. Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 603 ("In fact, courts do not attempt to use judicial
instructions as a means of debiasing jurors. Instructions typically ask for unbiased ex post
judgments of ex ante probabilities without suggesting how to accomplish this complex cognitive
task.").
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information might increase people's desire to attend to it."303 Professors
Andrew Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, and Jeffrey Rachlinski have explained
that during a trial, "jurors might view instructions to ignore evidence
as an unwarranted intrusion on their ability to decide a case as they see
fit." 30 4 Because warning people about hindsight bias has no meaningful
30
curative effect, jury instructions are unlikely to resolve the problem. 5
Studies on hindsight bias teach us that it is difficult for people
to ignore information after learning about it because of "cognitive
forces-it is difficult to train our mind to ignore information when we
constantly train it to incorporate all available information-as well as
motivational factors-it is more pleasant to perceive ourselves as those
who were sharp enough to predict the unpredictable." 30 6 This is the
30 7
essence of hindsight bias and it is "essentially impossible to avoid."
This lesson about human behavior applies no less to jurors than the
general population. 308
Once a person knows of an actual outcome, it is all but
impossible to eliminate the effects of hindsight bias. Debiasing
techniques cannot eradicate hindsight bias. 309 Although people are
3 10 warning them about
generally unaware of their own hindsight bias,
the likelihood and consequences of hindsight bias has no meaningful
effect. 311 Indeed, "[p]sychologists have uncovered no way to instruct

303. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1261; see also Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton,
Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying & Jennifer Payne, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 666 (2001) ("In
general, limiting instructions have proven to be ineffective and have even been associated with a
paradoxical increase in the targeted behavior.").
304. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1261.
305. Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 603 ("Judicial instructions are unlikely to include a
mechanism that would fare any better.").
306. Teichman, supra note 6, at 354.
307. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 824.
308. See Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1255 ("Most observers agree that it is not easy for
jurors to deliberately disregard what they know.").
309. Fischhoff, supra note 28, at 428 ("Research on this bias has included investigations of
most of the possible debiasing strategies included in the previous section. Few of these techniques
have successfully reduced the hindsight bias; none has eliminated it."); see also Rachlinski, supra
note 27, at 586 ("Fischhoffs demonstration of the hindsight bias was followed by a series of efforts
to find a successful debiasing strategy-a way of evaluating the predictability of past events
accurately. These efforts have been unsuccessful."); Teichman, supra note 6, at 364 ("[A] significant
body of work has demonstrated that undoing the effects of the hindsight bias is a thorny task.").
310. Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 711-12 ("[I]ndividuals are apparently unaware of the
effect that outcome knowledge has on their perceptions."); Fischhoff & Beyth, supra note 5, at 3
("In particular, we found that judges appear to be generally incapable of assessing the changes in
their judgments induced by possession of outcome knowledge.").
311. Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 603 ("Psychologists have uncovered no way to instruct
people on how to evaluate decisions in hindsight in a way that completely avoids the hindsight
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people on how to evaluate decisions in hindsight in a way that
completely avoids the hindsight bias." 312 One meta-analysis of almost
one hundred studies on hindsight bias reported that "manipulations to
reduce hindsight bias did not result in significantly smaller effect
sizes." 3 13 Ultimately, debiasing is "a nonviable solution to the effects of
[hindsight] bias." 3 1 4 In short, jury instructions cannot solve the problem
of hindsight bias in antitrust litigation.
B. Hindsight Bias and Antitrust Judges
Another possible solution would be to rely more heavily on
judges rather than juries to make factual determinations about
elements of antitrust claims that are susceptible to hindsight bias. The
conventional wisdom is that judges can ignore inadmissible evidence
and not accord it weight in their decisionmaking. Judges are assumed
to be better at this task than jurors. 3 15 This may be true in some limited
contexts. For example, research suggests that some judges may be able,
to avoid hindsight bias in probable cause determinations. 31 6 This may,
however, be an atypical instance in which judges are uniquely able to,
disregard inadmissible evidence. It may be that judges are less
bias."); see also Fischhoff, supra note 19, at 343 ("[M]erely warning people about the dangers of
hindsight bias has little effect.").
312. Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 603; see Wolfgang Hell et al., Hindsight Bias:An Interaction
of Automatic and Motivational Factors? 16 MEMORY & COGNITION 533. 533 (1988) (finding that
offering people monetary incentives does not reduce the occurrence of hindsight bias).
313. Rebecca L. Guilbault, Fred B. Bryant, Jennifer H. Brockway & Emil J. Posavac, A MetaAnalysis Research On Hindsight Bias, 26 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 103, 110 (2004).
314. Teichman, supra note 6, at 366 ("In sum, legal scholars have tended to view de biasing
procedure as a nonviable solution to the effects of the bias (Rachlinski 1998). To the extent this
argument refers to the possibility of completely eradicating the influence of the bias on decisionmakers, it is undoubtedly correct."); Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Outcome Feedback:
Hindsight and Information, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION

605, 606 (1989) ("The overwhelming verdict ... is that the hindsight bias is a robust phenomenon
that is not easily eliminated or even moderated.").
315. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1277 (2005) ("For several reasons, judges might be better
able than jurors to disregard inadmissible information."); id. at 1255-56 ("[C]ommentators have
argued that judges are much better able than jurors to ignore inadmissible evidence.").
316. Id. at 1317:
Our study produced no evidence that the hindsight bias affected the judges'
assessments of probable cause. Knowledge of the fruits of the search had no discernible
effect on judges' decision making. Judges were able to ignore the damning evidence that
the search produced and make essentially the same decision as judges who were
unaware of what the search would uncover. The results also reveal only the slightest
trend towards a hindsight bias.;
see also Teichman, supra note 6, at 360 ("[W]hile judges are not immune from the bias, there are
indications that its effect on their behavior is significantly smaller than its effect on untrained
individuals.").
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susceptible to hindsight bias in probable cause cases because they
frequently encounter this issue. 317 Antitrust litigation is different;
judges decide antitrust cases relatively infrequently and may not
recognize when attempted monopolization occurs if they are prone to
granting summary judgment against valid claims.
Importantly, relying on judges instead of juries does not
eliminate hindsight bias. 318 In most situations, judges exhibit hindsight
bias just as jurors do.3 19 Judges cannot avoid hindsight bias because it
is a nondeliberate

cognitive bias that happens subconsciously. 3 2 0

Controlled experiments involving actual judges demonstrate that
judges are influenced by inadmissible evidence. 321 In particular,
experimental research demonstrates that "judges informed of a
particular outcome were much more likely than the other judges to have
322 For
identified that outcome as the most likely to have occurred."
example, in the context of tort litigation, "researchers found that judges
were more likely to identify conduct as unreasonable, negligent, or even
323
reckless after learning that the conduct had produced an accident."
Similarly, even when a defendant's adoption of remedial measures after
an accident is inadmissible to demonstrate that the defendant was
negligent before the accident, research shows judges to be unable to
disregard this inadmissible evidence when making their negligence
determination. 324 Ultimately, hindsight bias "is virtually impossible to
purge from legal decision making and influences both jurors and
325
experienced judges alike."
317. Rachlinski et al., supra note 44, at 97:
Judges would be able to remember specific rulings on probable cause cases, and could
have engaged analogical reasoning processes to try to recall cases similar to those that
we provided. If so, and if hindsight does not affect their ability to recall similar cases,
then this process might have insulated judges from the influence of the hindsight bias.
318. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 801 ("Greater reliance on judges is unlikely to eliminate
its effect on adjudication. Although experience reduces the effect of the hindsight bias somewhat,
it does not eliminate it.").
319. Id. at 818 ("[Jjudges in our study exhibited hindsight bias to the same extent as mock
jurors and other laypersons."); id. at 804 ("[OJur findings are consistent with other studies showing
that judges are vulnerable to the hindsight bias.").
320. Id. at 804 ("When predicting the likelihood of something after the fact, judges cannot help
but rely on facts that were unavailable before the fact.").
321. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1259 ("[W]e found that some types of highly relevant,
but inadmissible, evidence influenced the judges' decisions.").
322. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 802 (citations omitted).
323. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1314.
324. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effects of
PotentiallyBiasingInformation on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113,
117 (1994).
325. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 827.
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Thus, although it might seem attractive to simply assign issues
to judges and educate them about hindsight bias, 326 education is no
panacea. 327 Even when judges are warned about the risk of hindsight
bias, they are still subject to it. As with laypeople, educating judges
about hindsight bias does not completely mitigate its effects. 328
Nevertheless, judicial education about hindsight bias may still be
useful. At a minimum, appellate judges should be on the lookout for
district court judges committing hindsight bias and should, when
appropriate, reverse decisions that seem affected by hindsight bias.
C. HindsightBias and the Sheltered Jury
The most direct way to address hindsight bias by antitrust juries
is for judges to suppress evidence of subsequent market performance.
In non-antitrust contexts, legal scholars have noted that "[t]he best way
to prevent inadmissible information from influencing jurors is to shield.
them from it altogether." 3 2 9 There is no obvious downside to not.
informing jurors of a firm's subsequent market performance. 330 This
information is not part of an attempted monopolization or predatory
pricing claim under Section Two or a per se claim under Section One.
Some scholars have argued that suppressing evidence cannot solve the
problem of hindsight bias in negligence trials because the jury will
necessarily intuit that an adverse event must have taken place and
then reason backwards that it would not have occurred unless the
defendant had been negligent. 331 But this reasoning does not apply to
Section Two claims that do not require actual monopolization or
recoupment, or to Section One claims in which the agreement alone
violates antitrust law.
After documenting hindsight bias in many legal contexts,
Professors Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski advocated a greater
326. Id. at 821 ("[J]udges might learn to educate themselves about cognitive illusions so that
they can try to avoid the errors that these illusions tend to produce.").
327. See supra notes 299-314 and accompanying text.
328. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 825 ("Unfortunately, understanding the hindsight bias
does nothing to reduce its influence; neither does instructing subjects to be careful to avoid its
effects. The judges in our study revealed a strong hindsight bias. Previous research suggests that
correcting for the bias is not feasible.").
329. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1253; see also Teichman, supra note 6, at 366 ("Once
jurors are unaware of the outcome, so the argument goes, the problems of judging in hindsight can
be eliminated.").
330. Jolls et al., supranote 54, at 1529 ("If hindsight bias is unimportant, then whether jurors
are told what outcome occurred should not matter; either way, they should be able to make a
correct ex ante determination.").
331. Rachlinski, supra note 27, at 605.

1588

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:5:1527

reliance on juries as a possible solution. 332 Judges can shield jurors from
information that may lead to hindsight bias. 3 3 3 The professors reasoned
that "when the only means of avoiding the effect of a cognitive illusion
is to restrict access to the information that triggers it, a jury trial has a
3 34
substantial advantage over a bench trial."

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a sound basis for
excluding evidence that invites hindsight bias. In admitting evidence of
subsequent market performance, courts assert that the evidence is
relevant and, therefore, admissible. But these are separate inquiries.
Although antitrust courts are correct to characterize evidence of the
335
defendant's subsequent market performance as sometimes relevant,
that does not necessarily mean that such evidence is admissible. In the
context of post-conduct evidence in antitrust litigation, courts are often
too quick to equate relevant and admissible. 336 Such conflation is
improper because relevant evidence is inadmissible if it is substantially
more prejudicial than probative. 337
In non-antitrust contexts, courts have noted that hindsight bias
can render evidence of subsequent events substantially more
prejudicial than probative and thus inadmissible. For example, in a
takings case involving a rezoning decision after condemnation
proceedings had taken place, Justice Kelly of the Michigan Supreme
Court explained that evidence of the post-condemnation rezoning
should not be admitted because "'hindsight bias' [can] .

..

lead[] the

jury to give the evidence undue weight and render it
unfairly prejudicial." 338 Relevance alone does not answer the question
of admissibility because hindsight "bias demonstrates why the evidence
can be relevant yet unfairly prejudicial." 3 3 9 Furthermore, limiting
instructions cannot solve the problem, the Justice noted, because the
risk remains that "the jury will accord it weight wildly disproportionate

332. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 821 ("[T]he legal system might consider reallocating
decision-making power between judges and juries as a means of reducing the effects of cognitive
illusions.").
333. Wistrich et al., supra note 49, at 1259 ("[W]e contend that jury trials should be favored
over bench trials because judges can shield jurors from inadmissible information in ways that they
cannot shield themselves.").
334. Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 827.
335. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
337. FED. R. EVID. 403 ('The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice . . . .").
338. Mich. Dep't. of Transp. v. Haggerty Corridor Partners Ltd. P'ship, 700 N.W.2d 380, 400
(Mich. 2005) (Kelly, J., concurring).
339. Id.
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to its probative value and treat rezoning when the taking occurred as a
foregone conclusion."34 0
The risk of hindsight bias renders evidence of subsequent
market performance highly prejudicial. Jurors are too apt to conclude,
consciously or subconsciously, that if the defendant did not actually
achieve monopoly power, then such failure was inevitable and the
defendant never enjoyed a dangerous probability of monopolizing the
market. This is precisely the calculation that dozens of federal judges
have performed in attempted monopolization cases where courts have
granted summary judgment to antitrust defendants. 3 4 1 Given the power
of hindsight bias and the minimal probative value of post-conduct
market power, 342 courts can reasonably conclude that the prejudicial
effect of such evidence substantially outweighs its probative value and
therefore the evidence should not be admitted.343
Preventing jurors from hearing evidence that invites hindsight
bias is a practical solution for antitrust trials. But most antitrust claims
do not make it to juries, in part, because federal judges often grant
summary judgment on these claims, sometimes as a result of hindsight
bias. 34 4 Although a preference for jury trials over bench trials makes
sense after the litigation reaches the trial stage, it is harder to deal with
hindsight bias in the context of motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment. The judges deciding such motions generally know
whether the defendant's anticompetitive conduct succeeded or failed.
Judges cannot be made ignorant of such information. This provides an
additional reason for federal judges to be less quick to grant summary
judgment to antitrust defendants. If the judge knows that the
defendant's conduct failed to create monopoly power or that the
defendants' alleged conspiracy failed to succeed, the judge's
susceptibility to hindsight bias may lead her to an incorrect conclusion
about the ex ante likelihood of success.
Judges need to recognize that their exposure to outcome
information subconsciously affects their ability to process information.
Perhaps this will lead them to appreciate the value of a jury that is
unaware of the outcome and that will be unaffected by hindsight bias.
Unfortunately, because people generally believe that they are

340. Id. at 339-400.
341. See supra Section II.A.
342. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing how firms can have a dangerous
probability of monopolizing the market even when their market shares decrease).
343. See supranote 337 and accompanying text.
344. See supraPart II.
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unaffected by cognitive biases, it may be hard to convince judges that
they themselves are susceptible to hindsight bias and should thus give
the case to a clean-slate jury. This suggests another advantage to
educating judges about the risk of hindsight bias: even though
education cannot prevent an individual from experiencing hindsight
bias in a specific case, it may help judges recognize the larger problem
and rely more on juries that have not heard information that invites
hindsight bias.
Appellate panels should be alert to the possibility that hindsight
bias has affected a trial judge's decisionmaking. This bias may be
reflected in an opinion that mentions or emphasizes the failure of the
defendant's alleged anticompetitive scheme. Or, instead, hindsight bias
may be triggered by the defendant's argument that the failure of its
alleged plan proves a lack of attempt or absence of dangerous
probability of success. Such opportunities for hindsight bias warrant an
effort by appellate judges to ferret out this bias and, where appropriate,
reverse any opinions tainted by it.
CONCLUSION

This Article has presented dozens of examples of federal judges
succumbing to hindsight bias when adjudicating antitrust claims. This
is unfortunate because when hindsight bias distorts the results of
antitrust cases, it can have real consequences for markets. Attempted
monopolization schemes can inflict antitrust injuries on efficient
competitors even when the defendant fails to monopolize the market.
Similarly, when predatory pricing plans do not recoup the defendant's
investment in below-cost pricing, they can nevertheless create
inefficiency, injure efficient competitors, and impose illegal overcharges
on consumers in the post-predation period. Even price-fixing
conspiracies that fail to raise prices can inflict injuries on consumers.
Hindsight bias prevents antitrust law from achieving its goals of
deterring and penalizing anticompetitive conduct that imposes
antitrust injury on efficient competitors-in the cases of attempted
monopolization and predatory pricing claims-and on consumers in the
case of price fixing.
Research shows that hindsight bias is not easily remedied. Once
exposed to information about actual outcomes, people-including
judges-find it too difficult to disregard that information when
calculating ex ante probabilities even if they know that they should
ignore it. Federal judges should be cognizant of the risk of hindsight
bias and their own susceptibility to it. In many cases, this awareness
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should make judges less eager to grant summary judgment to antitrust
defendants and more willing to limit jury exposure to outcome evidence.
Such changes would better enable courts to achieve the goals of
antitrust law.
The fact that judges deciding antitrust cases have fallen victim
to hindsight bias has implications both for the field of behavioral
economics and for antitrust law. With respect to the former, behavioral
economics has been providing insights into how individuals make
decisions and how markets operate for decades. For much of that time,
economists and legal scholars have applied these insights to legal
doctrine and procedure. This Article demonstrates another area of
decisionmaking in which hindsight bias can distort results in litigation.
To the extent that anybody still doubts whether hindsight bias exists,
this Article provides another data point-or series of data points-in
illustration of the general principle that knowing subsequent events
can affect one's ex ante estimation of probabilities. Appellate courts
should examine records for evidence of hindsight bias and reverse when
hindsight bias has caused a trial judge to improperly dismiss an
antitrust claim or to improperly grant summary judgment to an
antitrust defendant. 345 Antitrust law does not limit its condemnation or
penalties to profitable conspiracies and predatory conduct. Antitrust
law punishes anticompetitive conduct that inflicts antitrust injury on
competitors and consumers, regardless of whether the defendant
initially profited from its misdeeds. The sine qua non of an antitrust
violation is not the defendant's success, but the competitive injuries
caused by the defendant's anticompetitive conduct.
Given that economics plays a greater role in antitrust law than
most other areas of law, it makes sense that behavioral economics is
particularly suited to inform antitrust doctrine and procedure. The
cases discussed in Part III provide more evidence for the proposition
that hindsight bias is difficult to prevent. Federal judges have been put
on notice to avoid the risk of hindsight bias when evaluating attempted
monopolization. Indeed, using subsequent events to predict the
probability of actual monopolization is inappropriate as a matter of law.
Nonetheless, several judges admit to doing so in their written opinions,
effectively rewriting antitrust doctrine.

345. The presence of hindsight bias does not necessarily mandate reversal if the plaintiffs
attempted monopolization claim should fail for an independent reason untainted by hindsight bias.

